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PROLOGUE
In May 1990, while doing research connected with this Essay, I
chanced upon a McDonald's Restaurant on the north side of Chicago
which advertised itself as the "rock and roll" McDonald's. Various
memorabilia from the 1950's and 1960's, including a small American
flag with its field of stars replaced by a peace symbol, festooned the
walls of the restaurant. Such altered flags were common during the
Vietnam era, and many dissenters were prosecuted under flag desecra-
tion laws for displaying them. Yet this flag on the wall of McDon-
* Robert Justin Goldstein is a Professor of Political Science at Oakland University in
Rochester, Michigan. The author has previously addressed civil liberties issues in various
articles and books. See, e.g., R. GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA
(1978).
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aid's, although arguably illegal in May 1990 under the once valid Flag
Protection Act of 1989,1 attracted no attention from customers who
seemed far more interested in Big Macs than in desecrated flags or
constitutional debates over the meaning of the Bill of Rights. While it
seems unlikely that in another twenty years the neighborhood
McDonald's will be burning flags, this incident suggests the reason-
able possibility that, within a few years, the American public's interest
in the heatedly controversial flag burning issue will become little more
than an historical footnote, and that future generations of Americans
will have difficulty understanding the basis for this controversy. Like
the peace symbol flag displayed on the wall of McDonald's, the flag
burning cause, which was dear to many Americans during 1989 and
1990, ultimately may well become an arcane issue significant only to
those interested in history. Thus, I have termed the recent contro-
versy The Great 1989-1990 Flag Flap.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past two years, the issue of whether flag burning is
legal as a form of political protest spurred massive controversy across
the United States.2 The flag burning controversy attracted enormous
public, political, and legal attention, which especially centered around
two notable Supreme Court cases upholding the legality of flag burn-
ing,3 two failed attempts to pass a constitutional amendment outlaw-
ing flag burning,4 and the passage of a law to accomplish the same
end.' Although the crux of the legal debate primarily focused on how
correctly to interpret the Bill of Rights, the public and political debate
was perhaps even more dominated by the historically recent iconiza-
tion of the American flag as a symbol of the nation. As a result, flag
burning quickly became a highly political controversy in which many
officials found it easy both to demonstrate their purported love for the
flag and to use this issue for self-interested gain.
Because any attempt to isolate the legal aspects of this contro-
versy from its historical and political components would be both mis-
leading and futile, this Essay will analyze all three elements within
one construct. In a broader context, this Essay argues that flag dese-
cration, interpreted both from a constitutional law perspective and
1. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 700).
2. See infra notes 58-65 & 419-37 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 109 S.
Ct. 2533 (1989); see also infra notes 28-57, 438-522 & 636-84 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 524-58 & 685-706 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 560-621 and accompanying text.
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from the common sense meaning of political freedom in a democracy,
is a form of peaceful political dissent which causes no concrete harm
and deserves full constitutional protection. Section II of this Essay
provides a concise legal history of Texas v. Johnson,6 recounts the cor-
responding public uproar following that decision, and briefly discusses
in a broader context whether flag burning is essentially a trivial mat-
ter or one of fundamental importance to democratic principles. Sec-
tion III traces both the historical development of Americans' attitude
toward the flag and the development of flag desecration laws. This
Section also provides a case background leading to Johnson by dis-
cussing earlier court decisions interpreting symbolic speech and the
use of flags. Section IV discusses the popular, political, and legal
debate over the Johnson decision. Section V pertains to the aftermath
of Johnson and focuses on the 1989 Congressional debate over
whether to overturn Johnson by statute or constitutional amendment,
and the eventual product of this debate, The Flag Protection Act of
1989. Section V also discusses two federal district court decisions that
declared The Flag Protection Act unconstitutional as applied to polit-
ical protesters. Section VI discusses United States v. Eichman,7 the
decision reaffirming the constitutionality of flag burning, and the sub-
sequent failure to overturn it by constitutional amendment. Section
VII provides a basis for understanding why a handful of flag burners,
whose only threat was the introduction of a strong message of polit-
ical dissent into the marketplace of ideas, could cause such an explo-
sive reaction amongst legal scholars, politicians, and the public. This
Section suggests that the explanations for this reaction, or overreac-
tion, reflect poorly upon the current state of American politics and its
citizens' and leaders' understanding of the role of civil liberties in a
democracy.
II. TEXAS v JOHNSON IN PERSPECTIVE
A. A Short Legal History of Johnson
On August 22, 1984, while the Republican National Convention
met in Dallas to renominate President Ronald Reagan, Gregory Lee
"Joey" Johnson and about one hundred other protesters participated
in a demonstration that culminated with the burning of an American
flag in front of the Dallas city hall.' Although no civil disorder
occurred during or after the actual flag burning, some of the protes-
ters had earlier spray-painted the walls of several buildings and com-
6. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
7. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
8. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2536.
1990]
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mitted other minor acts of vandalism, including the theft from a bank
of what was presumably the subsequently burned flag.9 Dallas police
officers observed the entire demonstration but made no arrests during
the actual protest."0 Subsequently, the police arrested Johnson for a
violation of the Texas Venerated Objects Law."' This law outlawed
"desecration" of "venerated objects," including "intentionally or
knowingly" desecrating a "national flag."' 2 The law defined "dese-
crate" as to "deface, damage or otherwise physically mistreat in a way
that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely
to observe or discover his action."'
' 3
Johnson was convicted in December 1984, and received both a
one year prison sentence and a $2,000 fine.' 4 The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Supreme Judicial District of Texas affirmed.' 5 Although
holding that under the United States Supreme Court test of Spence v.
Washington,' 6 Johnson's action was "symbolic speech" requiring first
amendment scrutiny,' 7 the court concluded that the Texas law did not
violate Johnson's first amendment rights.' 8 Relying on Deeds v.
State,'9 a Texas flag burning case that preceded Spence, the court of
appeals found that the statute advanced two state interests which
would override Johnson's first amendment rights: "prevent[ing]
breaches of the public peace" and "protecting the flag as a symbol of
national unity."
'20
In April 1988, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed by
a 5-to-4 vote, holding that application of the Texas Venerated Objects
law unconstitutionally deprived Johnson of his first amendment
9. Id. at 2536-37; Brief for Petitioner at 2-6, Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989)
(No. 88-155) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
10. Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92, 93-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ("Johnson IF'), aff'd,
109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
11. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2537 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(a)(3) (Vernon
1974)).
12. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(a)(3) (Vernon 1974).
13. Id. § 42.09(b).
14. Johnson II, 755 S.W.2d at 93; Joint Appendix at 1, Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533
(1989) (No. 88-155) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
15. Johnson v. State, 706 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) ("Johnson P'), rev'd, 755
S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989); Joint Appendix, supra note
14, at 1.
16. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
17. Johnson I, 706 S.W.2d at 124.
18. Id. at 123-24. The court also held that the law was not unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad. Id.
19. 474 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
20. Johnson I, 706 S.W.2d at 123-24.
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rights.21 Rejecting Deeds in light of subsequent United States
Supreme Court decisions,22 the court held that Johnson had engaged
in protected "symbolic speech" and that Texas had not demonstrated
any state interests that would override this protection.23 Relying on
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,24 the court considered
Texas' proffered interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of unity to
be inadequate in the face of Johnson's compromised first amendment
rights:
Recognizing that the right to differ is the centerpiece of our First
Amendment freedoms, a government cannot mandate by fiat a feel-
ing of unity in its citizens. Therefore, that very same government
cannot carve out a symbol of unity and prescribe a set of approved
messages to be associated with that symbol when it cannot man-
date the status or feeling the symbol purports to represent. If the
State has a legitimate interest in promoting a State approved sym-
bol of unity, that interest is not so compelling as to essentially
license the flag's use for only the promotion of governmental status
quo.
25
The court explained that for Texas to override Johnson's first
amendment rights, it would have to show that Johnson's action posed
a "grave and immediate danger" that the flag would lose its ability to
"rouse feelings of unity or patriotism" and become devalued "into a
meaningless piece of cloth. ' ' 26 Concluding that no such danger was
present, the court-held the Texas Venerated Objects statute unconsti-
21. Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2533
(1989).
22. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988) (holding the emotive impact of
speech is not a secondary effect unrelated to the content of the expression itself); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (noting that the Court must first determine whether
actions constituted expressive conduct).
23. Johnson I, 755 S.W.2d at 95-97. The court held that the Texas law was "too broad
for First Amendment purposes" to prevent breaches of the peace in the case at hand because
by banning all flag desecration that caused "serious offense," the law outlawed "protected
conduct which has no propensity to result in breaches of the peace." Id. at 95-96. The court
specifically noted that the flag burning had caused a "serious offense" to observers, but that no
violence had been associated with the actual burning. Id. The court remarked that on the
same day of Johnson's arrest, demonstrators in Dallas burned the national flag of a foreign
country which led to a "physical brawl," yet no arrests had occurred under the statute. Id. at
94 n.3. The court also noted that Texas had a separate disorderly conduct statute that
prohibited intentional, public utterance of words or offensive gestures or displays which tended
to "incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. at 96 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 42.01 (Vernon 1974)). According to the court, this statute adequately proscribed flag
desecration which led to violence, without infringing upon protected expression, unlike the
Texas Venerated Objects law. Id.
24. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
25. Johnson II, 755 S.W.2d at 97.
26. Id. (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641-42).
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tutional as applied to "acts of flag desecration when such conduct falls
within the protections of the First Amendment."27
Texas appealed to the United States Supreme Court.28 On certio-
rari,29 the Supreme Court affirmed, ruling in a 5-to-4 decision that
application of the Texas statute unconstitutionally deprived Johnson
of his first amendment rights to engage in political expression.3" The
Court's decision was fundamentally similar to that of the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, although it was more fully elaborated and more
rigorously based in Supreme Court precedents. Using the Spence
test3" for determining whether particular conduct possesses sufficient
communicative elements to require first amendment protection, the
Court first determined that the "expressive, overtly political nature"
[of Johnson's conduct] was "both intentional and overwhelmingly
apparent."32 Next, the Court refused to apply what it termed the
"relatively lenient standard" of the United States v. O'Brien33 test to
determine whether Texas' claimed interests outweighed Johnson's
first amendment rights.31 First, the Court declared that despite
Texas' claim of a legitimate interest in preventing a breach of the
peace, "no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or threatened to
27. Id. The court reasoned that because the statute was unconstitutional as applied to
Johnson, a facial determination was unnecessary. Id. The court specifically declined to
address whether Texas could prosecute flag desecrations which did "not constitute speech
under the First Amendment," and therefore did not respond to Johnson's contention that the
statute was facially invalid on grounds of vagueness. Id.
28. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at app. 1.
29. See Official Transcript of Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States,
Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (No. 88-155) [hereinafter Offical Transcript].
30. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2547 (1989).
31. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2538 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974)) (stating
that context may give meaning to a symbol, and is thus important in determining whether
symbolic activity is sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the
scope of the first and fourteenth amendments). For a discussion of Spence, see infra notes 388-
97 and accompanying text.
32. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540.
33. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
34. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
Under this test, the Court has held that where "important or substantial" governmental
interests are involved, the "non-speech" aspects of "conduct" which combine both "speech"
and "non-speech" elements can be regulated, so long as the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77. In considering Texas'
interest in preventing a breach of peace, the Court first held that under the standards
propounded in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding the Court must
consider whether the expression of a provocative idea is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such ideas), and Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that "fighting words" or personal insults that by
their very nature inflict injury or tend to incite a breach of the peace are not protected under
the first amendment), the state's interest in maintaining order is not implicated. Johnson, 109
S. Ct. at 2542. For a discussion of O'Brien, see infra notes 368-72 and accompanying text.
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occur because of Johnson's burning of the flag,"' 35 and therefore, "the
state's interest in maintaining order [was] not implicated."36
Addressing Texas' second asserted interest, preserving the flag as
a symbol of nationhood and national unity, the Court noted Texas'
concern that flag burning would convince people that "the flag does
not stand for nationhood and national unity" or that "we do not enjoy
unity as a nation."3 I However, consistent with Spence,as the Court
pointed out that such "concerns blossom only when a person's treat-
ment of the flag communicates some message."' 39  Because Texas'
interest was related "to the suppression of free expression," the
O'Brien test did not apply.' Instead, the Court held the statute "con-
tent based" under Boos v. Barry,41 because it restricted Johnson's free-
dom of expression based on "the content of the message he
conveyed."42 Under this doctrine, the state's interest "in preserving
the special symbolic character of the flag" is subject to "the most
exacting scrutiny. 4 3
Under Boos, Texas was required to show that the "regulation
[was] necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it [was]
narrowly drawn to achieve that end."'  Only then could Texas
abridge Johnson's first amendment rights.45 Texas, however, failed to
show a compelling state interest because the purpose of the law was to
prevent citizens from conveying "harmful" messages that "cast doubt
on either the idea that nationhood and national unity are the flag's
35. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2541. The Court stated that Texas' position amounted to a
"claim that an audience that takes serious offense at a particular expression is necessarily likely
to disturb the peace," and that all flag burnings posed a "potential for breach of peace" which
could justify suppression. Id. at 2542. Rejecting this claim, the Court determined that such a
position would "eviscerate" the Brandenburg doctrine and fly in the face of numerous
precedents, such as FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (holding that the
very fact that expression caused offense "is a reason for according it constitutional
protection"). Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2541-42.
36. Id. at 2542.
37. Id.
38. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1974) (concluding that
Government's interest in preserving the flag's special symbolic value is directly related to
expression in the context of activity).
39. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542.
40. Id.
41. 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988) (holding the emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a
secondary effect unrelated to the content of the expression itself); see also infra notes 411-12
and accompanying text.
42. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2543.
43. Id. (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 321).
44. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
45. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2544.
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referents or that national unity actually exists."'46 This interest, the
Court determined, violated the "bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment... that the Government may not prohibit expres-
sion of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable. ' 4 Therefore, the Court explained that "a state may not
criminally punish a person for... [expressions] critical of the flag, "48
whether verbal or nonverbal.49 Thus, the Court concluded that Texas
could not criminally punish a person for burning a flag as a means of
political protest, ° because the "Government may not prohibit expres-
sion simply because it disagrees with [the] message" regardless of the
"mode one chooses to express [that] idea."5"
Following the reasoning of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
the Court specifically rejected the constitutionality of a law which
could mandate that a symbol "be used to express only one view of its
referents"5 2 and which would allow the government to "foster its own
view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it."
'53
Further, the Court specifically rejected the creation of a "separate
judical category for the American flag alone" 54 which would exempt
the flag from the "joust of principles protected by the First Amend-
ment."55 The Court concluded that the "principles of freedom and
inclusiveness that the flag best reflects"5 6 would be reaffirmed by its
decision: "We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration,
for in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem
represents."
57
B. The Reaction to Johnson
The Supreme Court's Texas v. Johnson decision touched off what
one newspaper termed a "firestorm of indignation"58 and what News-
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969)).
49. The Court flatly declared that Texas' attempt to distinguish between "written or
spoken words and nonverbal conduct.., is of no moment where the nonverbal conduct is
expressive, as it is here, and where the regulation of that conduct is related to expression, as it
is here." Id. at 2545.
50. Id. at 2546.
51. Id. at 2547.
52. Id. at 2546.
53. Id. at 2545.
54. Id. at 2546.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2547.
57. Id. at 2547-48.
58. D'Antonio & Firstman, Rallying 'Round the Flag, NEWSDAY, July 2, 1989, at 4.
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week termed "stunned outrage"59 across the United States. Arguably,
the American political establishment had denounced no other
Supreme Court decision within recent memory with such speed and
vigor.' Within a week of the Johnson decision, President Bush
denounced flag burning as "dead wrong"6 and proposed a constitu-
tional amendment to overturn the decision. 62 Also within a week, the
Senate passed a resolution by a 97-to-3 vote expressing "profound dis-
appointment" with the ruling and approved an attempt to legislatively
overturn the decision.63 Similarly, the House of Representatives
approved by a 411 -to-15 vote an expression of "profound concern"
over the Court's action and then held an unusual all-night session
devoted to speeches denouncing flag burners and the Court.' By July
1, 1989, 172 Representatives and 43 Senators had sponsored 39 sepa-
rate resolutions calling for a constitutional amendment outlawing des-
ecration of the flag.65
By July 4, both legislative houses in at least four states had
approved resolutions calling on Congress to pass. a flag-protection
constitutional amendment,66 and individual legislative chambers in at
least another twelve states had either taken similar action or passed
resolutions criticizing the Johnson decision.67 A poll published in the
July 3 Newsweek indicated that sixty-five percent of the public dis-
agreed with the Court's ruling and that seventy-one percent favored a
constitutional amendment to overturn it.6" By October, 1.5 million
people had signed petitions to that effect.69 The Times Mirror Center
for the People and the Press found that the decision attracted more
public interest than any Washington news story since the beginning of
59. A Fight for Old Glory, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1989, at 18.
60. See infra notes 61-65 & 438-59 and accompanying text. Other provocative cases for
example, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring public school segregation
illegal), received criticism for the most part only in the South, while Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (defining and limiting a woman's constitutional right to have an abortion), sparked
both support and denunciation.
61. Biskupic, Flag-Burning, 'Dial-a-Porn'Acts Struck Down by Justices, 47 CONG. Q. 1547
(1989).
62. Biskupic, Flag Burning Ruling Sparks Cries for Action on Hill, 47 CONG. Q. 1622
(1989).
63. Biskupic, supra note 61, at 1548.
64. Biskupic, supra note 62, at 1622.
65. Id. at 1623.
66. Legislators Supporting Flag Move, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1989, at A6, col. 1 (Colorado,
Louisiana, Maine, and South Carolina).
67. Id. (California, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas).
68. A Fight for Old Glory, supra note 59, at 18.
69. A Shift in the Winds Swirling Around Old Glory, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 30,
1989, at 14.
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its surveys in 1986.70 Several aspiring capitalists even offered to
flameproof flags to protect them from roving flag burners.71
As'passions cooled, the drive for a constitutional amendment
failed with the Senate defeating President Bush's proposal in a 51-to-
48 vote on October 19, 1989.72 In the meantime, however, the House
and the Senate passed the Flag Protection Act of 1989, 73 which
became law without President Bush's signature on October 28."4
Those who backed the Flag Protection Act argued that the John-
son decision could be circumvented more quickly and with less dam-
age to constitutional rights by passing a statute as opposed to a
constitutional amendment.75 This statute would consist of a "content
neutral" law designed to avoid the "most exacting scrutiny"7 6 by sim-
ply banning outright various forms of desecration, regardless of the
motive of the actor or the impact upon the audience. This approach
was apparently based on various ambiguous comments made by the
Johnson Court. First, the Court had pointed out that its decision was
"bounded by the particular facts of this case and by the statute under
which Johnson was convicted" '77 and that the "prosecution of a [flag
desecrator] who had not engaged in expressive conduct would pose a
different case."' 78 The Court had also noted the Texas law was "not
aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circum-
stances, but [was] designed instead to protect it only against impair-
ments that would cause serious offense to others." '79 Thus,
proponents of the Flag Protection Act argued that a flat ban on flag
70. Zsa Zsa Story Outdraws Washington Scandals, Ann Arbor News, Oct. 15, 1989, at 134,
col. 1. Fifty-one percent of the respondents reported that they closely followed the Johnson
case. Id. For comparison purposes, six percent closely followed the scandals that led to the
resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita in May 1989, while eighty percent followed
the trial of actress Zsa Zsa Gabor in October 1989, for slapping a policeman. Id.
71. See The Flag; The Burning Question, TIME, Aug. 7, 1989, at 23; Great Moments in
Marketing, FORTUNE, July 31, 1989, at 274.
72. Biskupic, Anti-Flag Burning Amendment Falls Far Short in Senate, 47 CONG. Q. 2803
(1989). Passage required a two-thirds vote of those present and voting. Id.
73. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 700).
74. See Angle, Flag-Desecration Legislation Passed by House, 380-38, 47 CONG. Q. 2400
(1989); Biskupic, Flag Measure Will Become Law Without Bush's Signature, 47 CONG. Q. 2720
(1989); Biskupic, Senate Amends, Then Passes Bill on Flag Desecration,'47 CONG. Q. 2646
(1989); Dewar & Kenworthy, Support Lags for Amendment to Prohibit Flag Burning, Wash.
Post, July 25, 1989, at AI, col. 1.
75. For a discussion of the passage of the Flag Protection Act of 1989 and related
commentary, see infra notes 559-621 and accompanying text.
76. For a discussion of the "content neutral" test, see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying
text.
77. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2544 n.8 (1989).
78. Id. at 2538 n.3.
79. Id. at 2543.
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desecration would be a "content neutral" statute, having the "non-
speech" related interest of preserving the physical integrity of the flag
under all circumstances, and therefore constitutional under the more
lenient O'Brien standard. 0
Flag burners quickly tested the law in Seattle and Washington,
D.C. in October 1989.1 Two separate federal district courts held the
new law unconstitutional as applied to political protesters.8 2 Both
courts based their decisions on Johnson, coupled with a finding that
the Flag Protection Act was not "content neutral" either in its text or
in the underlying governmental interests which motivated its enact-
ment. a Under a mandatory expedited review process required by the
Flag Protection Act, 4 the Supreme Court, in United States v. Eich-
man, accepted jurisdiction in March 1990, met in special session to
hear oral arguments in May, and on June 11, affirmed the district
courts' findings.8 5 Although the Eichman decision spurred a new
move, backed by President Bush, for the passage of a constitutional
amendment to outlaw flag desecration, the general political atmos-
phere on the flag burning issue in the late spring of 1990 was consider-
ably less hysterical than it had been the previous year.16 Thus, the
proposed amendment, which required a two-thirds majority, was
soundly defeated by a 254-to-177 vote in the House of Representatives
on June 21, and a 58-to-42 vote in the Senate on June 26.87 Although
Republicans, who overwhelmingly voted for the amendment, prom-
ised to make opposing the amendment a major campaign issue in the
1990 election, 88 by September 1990, flag burning had largely disap-
peared as a subject of news or discussion, especially with threats of
war in the Middle East and of an economic recession capturing the
public's attention.
80. For a discussion of the justifications for the Flag Protection Act of 1989, see infra
notes 583-91 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 622-26 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 731 F. Supp. 1123 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2404
(1990); United States v. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Wash.), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
83. See Eichman, 731 F. Supp. at 1125; Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. at 418.
84. See Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, § 2(d)(2), 103 Stat. 777
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 700).
85. See Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2408.
86. See infra notes 688-706 and accompanying text.
87. Biskupic, Critics of Measure Win Fight, But Battle Scars Run Deep, 48 CONG. Q. 2063
(1990).
88. See Dillin, Republicans Say They'll Take Flag Issue Directly to American Voters,
Christian Sci. Monitor, June 25, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
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C. Much Ado About Nothing?
From one perspective, The Great 1989-1990 Flag Flap was an
excellent example of "much ado about nothing" in American history.
To put it mildly, the United States was not overrun with mobs of flag
burners in the 1980's; indeed, the Johnson case was the only flag burn-
ing reported in the New York Times from 1983 to 1988.89 As the
Tampa Tribune pointed out on June 28, 1989, "You are likely to live
a lifetime and never see a 'dissident' burn a flag, except on television
where such events are greatly welcomed. All we know about flag-
burners is that they are microscopically few and seriously deficient in
public-relations skills." 90 Further, as the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals noted, there is no evidence to support the contention that
desecrating the flag weakens its symbolic value. 9' Rather, the evi-
dence suggests that from the standpoint of promoting patriotism in
general and both verbal and actual flag waving in particular, John-
son's contribution was virtually unprecedented and certainly
unheralded.
92
It is unclear how the prohibition of flag burning as a means of
peaceful political protest could increase the symbolic patriotic value
of the flag to those who favor such a ban. It is clear, however, that
such a law or constitutional amendment will diminish the flag's ability
symbolically to represent political freedom to those Americans who
believe that the flag should be burned as a means of protest or that the
right symbolically to use the flag as a means of dissent should be con-
stitutonally protected. As Professor Arnold Loewy wrote, "Perhaps
the ultimate irony is that Johnson has done more to preserve the flag
as a symbol of liberty than any prior decision, while the decision's
detractors would allow real desecration of the flag by making it a
symbol of poltical oppression.' 93 Justice Brennan, writing for the
Johnson majority, made the same point:
[T]he flag's deservedly cherished place in our community will be
strengthened, not weakened, by our holding today. Our decision is
a reaffirmation of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that
the flag best reflects, and of the conviction that our toleration of
criticism such as Johnson's is a sign and source of our strength....
We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in
doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem
89. This conclusion is based on an examination of the New York Times' annual indexes.
90. Tampa Tribune (June 28, 1989), reprinted in 20 EDITORIALS ON FILE 715 (1989).
91. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
93. Loewy, The Flag Burning Case. Freedom of Speech when We Need It Most, 68 N.C.L.
REV. 165, 174 (1989).
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represents.94
As these quotations suggest, although the facts of Johnson were
isolated and ultimately insignificant, the Court's decision represents a
principle fundamental to the core values of a political democracy: the
right to vigorous, vehement, and even highly offensive and upsetting
dissent from governmental policy. Justice Brennan summed up this
key point in his opinion: "[I]f there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offen-
sive or disagreeable. 9 Similarly, Justice Jackson stated in West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education v. Barnette96 one of the most eloquent
and apposite paeans to democratic principles ever penned by the
Court:
Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find them-
selves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. It seems trite but
necessary to say that the First Amendment to our Constitution was
designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings.... The
case is made difficult not because the principles of its decision are
obscure but because the flag involved is our own. Nevertheless, we
apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom
to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will dis-
integrate the social organization .... [F]reedom to differ is not
limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as
to things that touch the heart of the existing order. If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion .... 9'
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FLAG DESECRATION LAW
A. Americans and Their Flag
In analogizing Justice Jackson's remarks to the present, it seems
that the controversy surrounding Johnson arose not from the general
principles concerning the right to dissent at issue in the case, but
instead, from the emotional response involved with desecrating a flag
that is "our own."9 For instance, if an opponent of the December
94. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2547-48 (1989).
95. Id. at 2544.
96. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding unconstitutional compulsory flag salutes and compulsory
recitals of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools).
97. Id. at 641-42; see also infra note 472.
98. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
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1989 American invasion of Panama were to burn a newspaper copy of
President Bush's explanation for this adventure, or even were to toss
an ax through his television set while the President was speaking,
neither action would likely merit a serious claim of illegality.99
Although ultimately any flag is simply a piece of cloth or other sub-
stance with colors or designs imprinted on it, many Americans have
clearly invested this cloth with emotionally high-charged values. As
Justice Jackson wrote in Barnette, "Symbolism is a primitive but
effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag
to symbolize some system, idea, institution or personality, is a short
cut from mind to mind. ' 'Ic °
The attempt to ban desecration of the American flag arises not
only from the fact that many Americans, including apparently most
of the elected political leadership, believe that the flag represents a
certain concept of liberty, nationalism, and patriotism which trans-
lates into political support for the country (whatever that means), but
also that those who disagree cannot use the flag to express other
views. But, again to quote Justice Jackson: "A person gets from a
symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man's comfort
and inspiration is another's jest and scorn." 10' Joey Johnson views
the flag as a "symbol of oppression, international murder and plun-
der."' 0 2 If there is to be any meaning to freedom of expression in the
United States, it can only be that if President Bush can wave the flag
as he invades Panama, then Joey Johnson can burn the flag in protest.
As Alexander Meiklejohn has written, the true meaning of freedom of
expression is that:
[If] on any occasion in the United States it is allowable to say that
the Constitution is a good document it is equally allowable... to
say that the Constitution is a bad document. If a public building
may be used in which to say, in time of war, that the war is justi-
fied, then the same building may be used in which to say that it is
not justified. If it be publicly argued that conscription for armed
service is moral and necessary, it may likewise be publicly argued
that it is immoral and unnecessary. If it may be said that Ameri-
can political institutions are superior to those of England or Russia
or Germany, it may, with equal freedom, be said that those of Eng-
land or Russia or Germany are superior to ours.... When a ques-
tion of policy is "before the house," free men choose it not with
99. If the television set belonged to someone else, of course, the attack would involve an
invasion of property rights, but this issue does not arise in the hypothetical as constructed.
100. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632.
101. Id. at 632-33.
102. Grogan, Demaret & Stewart, Unimpressed by the Freedom to Burn Old Glory, Joey
Johnson Still Wants a Revolution, PEOPLE, July 10, 1989, at 99.
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their eyes shut, but with their eyes open. To be afraid of ideas, any
idea, is to be unfit for self-government.
10 3
In the context of Meiklejohn's argument, it cannot make any dif-
ference that Johnson spoke symbolically rather than verbally., Every
court which heard the case concluded that Johnson's actions
amounted to political expression.' 4 Common sense suggests that the
motive for banning flag desecration is not that the burning of one flag
inflicts any concrete damage, but rather that people dislike the
message flag burning conveys. As Justice Brennan wrote, "The Gov-
ernment has no aesthetic property interest in protecting a mere
aggregration of stripes and stars for its own sake." 105 Supreme Court
decisions dating back to Stromberg v. California 10 6 and Barnette 107
(both flag cases) have concluded that many symbolic acts qualify for
first amendment protection. 8
Because flag desecration is a form of expression presumptively
entitled to first amendment protection, the nature of the strong Amer-
ican attachment to the flag would appear to be irrelevant from a legal
-standpoint. Nonetheless, to understand The Great 1989-1990 Flag
Flap requires a discussion of this subject at some length. In his dis-
senting opinion in Johnson,'09 Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted patri-
otic poetry to bolster his statement that "millions and millions of
Americans regard [the flag] with an almost mystical reverance."
'" 0
Fundamentally, his legal argument boils down to the proposition that
the flag occupies a "unique position as a symbol of our Nation, a uni-
queness that justifies a governmental prohibition against flag burning
in the way respondent Johnson did here.' Justice Stevens, in a sep-
arate dissent, adopted virtually the same position, declaring that the
question raised by desecration laws concerning the American flag was
"unique" and that therefore "rules that apply to a host of other sym-
bols, such as state flags, armbands, or various privately promoted
103. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
27 (1948).
104. See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540 (decision of the United States Supreme Court);
Johnson I1,'755 S.W.2d at 95-97 (decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals); Johnson I,
706 S.W.2d at 123-24 (decision of the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Supreme
Judicial District of Texas).
105. Kime v. United States, 459 U.S. 949, 953 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (holding that it is unconstitutional to prohibit use of a red flag to
signify peaceful opposition to government).
107. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that flag salute
and recital of Pledge of Allegiance cannot be compelled in public schools).
108. See infra notes 352-71 & 388-96 and accompanying text.
109. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2552 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2548.
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emblems of political or commercial identity, are not necessarily
controlling." 112
Both dissents emphasize the role of the flag in American history,
referring to "the soldiers who scaled the bluff at Omaha Beach"" 3 or
those who raised American flags at Iwo Jima and Inchon." 4 Chief
Justice Rehnquist even noted that "the flag has appeared as the prin-
cipal symbol on approximately 33 United States postal stamps and in
the design of at least 43 more, more times than any other symbol.""
In short, the dissenting judges adopted the position that Texas had
suggested in oral argument: There is a flag exception in the first
amendment. 116
Similarly, President Bush, in his first public remark about the
decision, declared that the American flag is "very, very special" and
burning it is "wrong, dead wrong.""' 7 The President subsequently
declared that he felt "viscerally"" 8I and "very, very strongly""I9 about
the subject and that "what that flag embodies is too sacred to be
abused."' 2 ° Like many other defenders of the flag, President Bush
stressed that the flag was above all a "banner of freedom,"'' without
apparently sensing any irony in the fact that his position in support of
a constitutional amendment forbidding flag desecration amounted to
an attempt to preserve a symbol of freedom by destroying the crucial
substantive freedom that he wished symbolically to honor.
Bush's publicly expressed sentiments that the flag was too impor-
tant as a symbol of freedom to tolerate its desecration were typical of
those voiced by many others during The Great 1989-1990 Flag Flap.
This belief, and also the belief that flag desecration would seriously
pose a risk to the American system, are equally characteristic of pre-
112. Id. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 2557.
114. Id. at 2550 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 2551.
116. Official Transcript, supra note 29, at 9. Justice Kennedy asked Dallas County District
Attorney Kathi Drew, "What is the juridical category you're asking us to adopt in order to say
we can punish this kind of speech? Just an exception for flags? It's just a-there's just a flag
exception of the First Amendment?" Id. In response, Drew noted that "[t]o a certain extent,
we have made that argument in our brief." Id.
117. Toner, Bush and Many in Congress Denounce Flag Ruling, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1989,
at A8, col. 2.
118. Remarks of President George Bush (June 27, 1989), reprinted in The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, Press Conference by the President 4 (June 27, 1989).
119. Id. at 3.
120. Remarks of President George Bush (June 30, 1989), reprinted in The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President for a Constitutional Amendment to
Protect the Flag 2 (June 30, 1989).
121. Id. at I.
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vious, similar disputes.122 Thus, in 1947, Senator Alexander Wiley
declared that "subversives" had always targeted the flag "because
they recognize that if they can besmirch the symbol of the American
constitutional system they will have gone a long way in undermining
the republic."' 123 Following an incident in Georgia in 1966 during
which American and state flags were ripped during a civil rights
march, Governor Carl Sanders declared, "In my judgment, there is
no greater outrage that can be perpetrated against our nation and our
state."' 124 During 1967 hearings before a House Judiciary subcommit-
tee which eventually led to passage of the first federal flag desecration
law in 1968,125 Congressman James Quillen declared that the flag
"has always been the symbol of freedom and liberty," that "we could
not have any penalty too strict" for flag desecration, and that "any-
thing short of a firing squad, even though it be severe, would be agree-
able."' 126 During a March 1989 protest against a Chicago art exhibit
that invited visitors to step on a flag, one veteran declared that "the
flag to me is a living thing and they don't have any right to do that to
it,' 1 27 while another stated that when "[y]ou step on the flag, the
whole nation feels something."' 2  Following the Johnson decision,
one New York man declared, "If someone burned a flag in front of
me, I'd kill them, shoot them right down. I got a flag on my motorcy-
cle, my car and my camper and I'm putting one on my boat....
From now on, whatever I'm driving, there's going to be a flag on it-
that's my protest."'
129
The Texas legislature, in petitioning Congress to pass a constitu-
tional amendment overturning the Johnson decision, declared:
[W]hatever legal arguments may be offered to support [the Johnson
decision], the incineration or other mutilation of the flag . . . is
repugnant to all those who have saluted it, paraded beneath it on
122. See generally Prosser, Desecration of the American Flag, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 159 (1962).
123. 93 CONG. REC. 165 (1947).
124. See Georgia Governor Orders Protection of Flag at Cordele, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1966,
at A13, col. 4.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988).
126. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives on H.R. 271 and Similar Proposals to Prohibit Desecration of the Flag, 90th
Cong., 1st. Sess. 29, 40 (1967) [hereinafter Hearings].
127. Flag-on-Floor Exhibit Can Stay, Judge Rules, Ann Arbor News, Mar. 3, 1989, at C3,
col. 1.
128. Shryer, 3,000 Protest Chicago Exhibit of Flag on Floor, L.A. Times, Mar. 13, 1989, at
20, col. 1; see also Ayers, Keepers of the Flame Stake Freedom's Fire, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16,
1989, at A14, col. 5 (reporting 1989 Convention of Sons of the American Revolution in which
members passed a resolution declaring that "[olur flag, in essense, is considered a living person
in our society").
129. D'Antonio & Firstman, supra note 58, at 4.
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the Fourth of July, been saluted by its half-mast configuration, or
raised it inspirationally in remote corners of the globe where they
have defended the ideals of which it is representative; this legisla-
ture concurs with the court minority that the Stars and Stripes is
deserving of a unique sanctity, free to wave in perpetuity over the
spacious skies where our bald eagles fly, the fruited plain above
which our mountain majesties soar, and the venerable heights to
which our melting pot of peoples and their posterity aspire. 3 '
The American veneration of the flag is so extreme that leading
flag expert Whitney Smith has declared that "we have created some-
thing unique in the world: the flag as a religion, a civil religion."''
Smith added that "[t]he United States goes to the greatest extreme.
The flag has become our substitute for a royal family or religion. We
have made an icon out of it.,',
32
In the United States, what one law professor has termed "vexilla-
try" or the exaltation of the flag "into a kind of mystical reification of
the nation,"' 33 is a relatively recent development clearly associated
with the growth of American nationalism in the post-Civil War era.
Apparently, great patriots of the past committed acts that qualify as
flag descecration under modern standards: for example, one photo-
graph which survives from the Civil War shows President Lincoln
and General McClellan eating at a table covered with a flag.' 34 Fur-
thermore, the law has only recently recognized national respect for
the flag. Congress declared the "Star Spangled Banner" to be the
national anthem only in 1931,1 35 and it declared "The Stars and
Stripes Forever" to be the national march in 1987.136 Congress did
not establish Flag Day until 1949,' and expanded the observance
130. 135 CONG. REC. S10,825 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989). Not surprisingly, Texas did not
mention its role in attempting to overthrow the Union and the flag during the Civil War.
131. Alters, Historical Dilemma Colors the Debate over Old Glory, Boston Globe, July 2,
1989, at 1, col. I (quoting Whitney Smith, director of the Flag Research Center in Winchester,
Massachusetts).
132. Horn, Passions that Stir in the Breeze, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 29, 1989, at
54. Many democratic countries such as West Germany, Belgium, and Denmark have banned
flag desecration, while many others, including Japan, Great Britain, Canada, Australia,
France, Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands have not. See Prosser, supra note 122, at
213 n.292; see also Brief of the Christic Institute and 20 other organizations as amici curiae in
Support of Respondent at 27, Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (No. 88-155). In the
Soviet Union, flag desecration is punishable by a fine and up to two years in jail. Meisler, Why
Flag Case Stirred Such a Flap, L.A. Times, July 4, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
133. Mittlebeeler, Flag Profanation and the Law, 60 Ky. L.J. 886 (1972).
134. Flag Laws Still Wave, Civil Liberties, Sept. 1970, at 1, col. 1.
135. Rogers, Flying the Flag, Ann Arbor News, July 3, 1989, at Dl, col. 2.
136. 36 U.S.C. § 188 (1988).
137. 36 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). See generally Cain, Stars and Stripes Forever, COMMONWEAL,
Mar. 27, 1970, at 62.
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into Flag Week only in 1966.138 Although a magazine first published
the Pledge of Allegiance in 1892,139 the government did not endorse
the Pledge until 1942,14° when Congress codified flag etiquette for the
first time.141 Most significantly, while the first state laws prohibiting
flag desecration date only from 1897, no federal flag desecration law
was passed until 1968.142
B. American Flag Desecration and the Law: A Pre-1968 History
Although a scattering of flag desecration incidents speckled
American history prior to the twentieth 'century, none of them
aroused any form of institutionalized legal response until shortly
before 1900.143 Perhaps the earliest case occurred in 1634, when Cap-
tain John Endicott, the commander of a military company in Massa-
chusetts Bay Colony, defaced part of the red cross of the King's
colors in protest of its alleged connection with the papacy."4 In a
1783 incident during the American Revolutionary War, a British flag
was torn to pieces in New York.145 The birth of the new nation pro-
vided new flags for potential desecration. In one incident near Phila-
delphia in 1844, a young man named George Shifter was killed while
trying to protect the American flag from desecration. 146 On the verge
of the Civil War in January 1861, President Buchanon's Treasury Sec-
retary telegraphed orders that "if any one attempts to haul down the
Amerian flag, shoot him on the spot."' 47 Shortly thereafter, however,
protesters burned American flags with apparent impunity before a
cheering crowd in Liberty, Mississippi, and buried a flag in Memphis,
Tennessee. 148 However, in New Orleans, when an American flag was
stolen, dragged in the mud, and torn to shreds following the Union re-
occupation, one of the alleged perpetrators was executed after his con-
viction of treason in a military court. 149
* 138. 36 U.S.C. § 157a (1988).
139. See Pollak, The Republic for Which It Stands, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 567 (1989).
140. See id. at 567 n.8 (citing Act of June 22, 1942, ch. 435, § 7, 56 Stat. 380 (codified as
amended at 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1988))).
141. National Flag Code, ch. 435, § 1-5, 56 Stat. 377 (1942) (codified as amended at 36
U.S.C. § 173-177 (1988)); see also Cain, supra note 137, at 62.
142. See infra notes 250-88 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 144-61 and accompanying text.
144. Mittlebeeler, supra note 133, at 902.
145. Id.
146. B. MASTAI & M. MASTAI, THE STARS AND THE STRIPES 27 (1973).
147. Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation and five other organizations as amici curiae
at 7-8, Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (No. 88-155) [hereinafter Brief of Washington
Legal Foundation].
148. Mittlebeeler, supra note 133, at 902.
149. Fleming, Hail to the Flag, READERS DIGEST, Apr. 1969, at 190-91.
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Although widespread concern over flag desecration developed
shortly before the turn of the century, the primary focus was not upon
symbolic protests, but rather upon the increasing commercialization
of the flag and its use in political campaigns such that accidental dese-
cration occurred during political scuffles. 50 With regard to the grow-
ing commercial abuse of the flag, the American Flag Association
complained to a Senate Committee in 1902 that the flag appeared on
paper which wrapped food, cigars, and other items, adorned pillow
covers, door mats, and other household goods, and advertised such
items as bicycles, whisky, pool rooms, and variety shows. 151 Concern
over the desecration of the flag during political campaigns especially
grew following the widespead use of political advertisements attached
to the flag by both parties in 1896, with the result that "[i]n the excite-
ment and anger generated at that time the flag so used was torn down
and torn in pieces and trampled in the dust"'15 2 during incidents
which "occurred in all sections of the country."' 153 In one such exam-
ple in Council Bluffs, Iowa, a mounted assailant fired a shotgun at a
partisan banner attached to a flag, whereupon a soldier shot back,
killing the assailant's horse.
154
As the result of such incidents, groups such as the Patriotic
Order of Sons of America began pressing for federal and state legisla-
tion to ban flag desecration. 15 5 Although flag protection legislation
passed the House of Representatives in 1890, and the Senate in 1904
and again in 1908,156 no pervasive federal bill became law until
1968.157 However, several states passed such measures beginning in
1897, and by 1905, thirty-four states had passed flag desecration
laws.158 By 1915, thirty-nine states had flag desecration laws and
almost all of the remaining states passed such laws during World War
I or during the 1919 "red scare."' 5 9 Many of these laws were similar
because they had been patterned after New York's 1905 law, which
also served as the model for the 1917 Uniform Flag Law,16 subse-
150. Prosser, supra note 122, at 194-96.
151. Id. at 195 (citing S. REP. No. 506, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1904)).
152. See id. at 196 (quoting 9B U.L.A. 48 (1966)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 199.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 202.
158. Id.
159. See Note, Flag Burning, Flag Waving and the Law, 4 VAL. U.L. REV. 345, 362 (1970).
160. NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE L., PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-
SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING 323-24 (1917).
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quently enacted by many states. 61 Amidst World War I in 1918, the
American Bar Association endorsed the Uniform Flag Law as essen-
tial for the United States to maintain "its power and prestige" around
the world and at home, and to strike at the "insidious encroachments
of treason which strike at the symbol and the sovereignty
symbolized."'
62
Regarding both the national and state flags, desecration laws
generally prohibited two types of activities: (1) improper use, which
generally involved using the flag for commercial advertising pur-
poses; 16 and (2) desecration, which according to a 1966 New York
Statute, was to "publicly mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample
upon, or cast contempt upon by words or act."'6' Like many of the
flag laws in other states, the 1966 New York law broadly defined what
constituted a flag:
The words flag, standard, color, shield or ensign, as used in this
section, shall include any flag, standard, color, shield or ensign, or
any picture or representation, of either thereof, made of any sub-
stance, or represented on any substance, and of any size, evidently
purporting to be, either of, said flag, standard, color, shield or
ensign, of the United States of America, or of the state of New
York, or a picture or a representation, of either thereof, upon
which shall be shown the colors, the stars, and the stripes, in any
number of either thereof, or by which the person seeing the same,
without deliberation may believe the same to represent the flag,
colors, standard, shield or ensign of the United States of America
or of the state of New York.
1 6 5
Although in 1970 a handful of states punished desecration as an
otherwise unspecified misdemeanor, penalties in about fifteen states
were fines of $100 and/or thirty days imprisonment, and in most
states were fines of $500 to $1,000 and prison terms of six to twelve
months. 166 In Texas, the maximum jail term was twenty-five years. 1
67
The first two reported cases prosecuted under the state flag laws
161. See Rosenblatt, Flag Desecration Statutes: History and Analysis, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q.
193, 195-97.
162. Id. at 210 (quoting Report of the Commission on Uniform State Laws, 4 A.B.A. J. 527,
528 (1918)).
163. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 136(b) (Consol. 1966).
164. Id. § 136(d); see Hearings, supra note 126, at 324-46 (compiling flag desecration laws
in effect in 1967); Recent Development, Constitutional Law-Flag Misuse and the First
Amendment, 50 WASH. L. REv. 169, 169 n.2 (1974) (categorizing state laws).
165. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 136(g) (Consol. 1966).
166. See Tushla, Flag Desecration-The Unsettled Issue, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV, 201,
218-20 (1970); Note, supra note 159, at 362-67.
167. See Note, supra note 159, at 366.
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involved the selling of cigar boxes with flags imprinted upon them. 68
In each case, the court declared the relevant statute unconstitutional
as a violation of property rights, either facially 69 or as applied to a
particular defendant. 70 The first apparent use of a flag desecration
law to suppress political dissent came amidst a bitter strike in Colo-
rado in 1904, when two leaders of the radical Western Federation of
Miners, including "Big Bill" Haywood of subsequent fame as leader
of the Industrial Workers of the World, were arrested for printing a
flyer captioned "Is Colorado in America?"'' Against the backdrop
of a drawing of an American flag, the flyer protested repression of the
strike by martial law and arbitrary arrests.' 72 Authorities subse-
quently dropped the charges when Haywood produced scores of
unprosecuted advertisements and circulars bearing the flag.1
7 3
These three early cases suggested that flag desecration laws
would be rendered nugatory. The United States Supreme Court,
however, aborted such a prospect in Halter v. Nebraska,'74 which
upheld a decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court convicting a busi-
nessman accused of selling "a bottle of beer [brand named Stars and
Stripes], upon which, for purposes of advertisement, was printed and
painted a representation of the flag of the United States."' 75
Although the case involved only the "improper use" and not the "des-
ecration" provision of the Nebraska law, and Halter involved no
claim of free speech, neither the Nebraska Supreme Court nor the
United States Supreme Court gave any indication that any challenge
to the "desecration" provisions would be any more successful.
Nebraska argued before the state supreme court that "[p]atriotic sen-
timent for the flag and for the noble motivations it symbolizes is out-
raged by the appearance of the national emblem on a bottle of beer,"
and that "[t]o permit this lawlessness to continue is to weaken respect
for law and order, and to impair the efficiency of government."'1
76
The Nebraska Supreme Court agreed, declaring:
Patriotism has ever been regarded as the highest civic virtue, and
168. See Rubstrat v. People, 185 Ill. 133, 57 N.E. 41 (1900); People ex. rel. McPike v. Van
de Carr, 178 N.Y. 425, 70 N.E. 965 (1904).
169. See, e.g., Rushtrat, 185 Ill. at 138, 57 N.E. at 46.
170. See, e.g., McPike, 178 N.Y. at 429, 70 N.E. at 966.
171. P. CARLSON, ROUGHNECK: THE LIFE AND TiMES OF BIG BILL HAYWOOD 70-71
(1983).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 74-75.
174. 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
175. Id. at 38.
176. Knapp, Old Nebraska Case Cited in Flag Burning Decision, Lincoln (Neb.) J., July 9,
1989, at Al, col. 1.
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whatever tends to foster that virtue certainly makes for the com-
mon good .... The flag is the emblem of national authority. To
the citizen it is an object of patriotic adoration, emblematic of all
for which his country stands ... and it is not fitting that it should
become associated in his mind with anything less exalted, nor that
it should be put to any mean or ignoble use.' 77
The United States Supreme Court's decision contained similar
oratory:
For that flag every true American has not simply an appreciation
but a deep affection. No American... ever looks upon it without
taking pride in the fact that he lives under this free Government
.... [A] State may exert its power to strengthen the bonds of the
Union and therefore, to that end, may encourage patriotism and
love of country among its people.... [L]ove both of the common
country and of the State will diminish in proportion as respect for
the flag is weakened .... As the statute in question evidently had
its origin in a purpose to cultivate a feeling of patriotism among the
people of Nebraska, we are unwilling to adjudge that ... the State
erred in its duty or has infringed the constitutional right of anyone.
On the contrary, it may reasonably be affirmed that a duty rests
upon each State in every legal way to encourage its people to love
the Union with which the State is indissolubly connected. 7 '
As the last Supreme Court decision dealing with flag misuse until
the 1969 case of Street v. New York, 179 Halter served as a major
authority until recently, and was cited by Chief Justice Rehnquist in
his Johnson dissent. 80 Halter, however, has virtually no practical rel-
evance today. Justice Brennan noted in Johnson that Halter dealt
explicitly and exclusively with commercial speech and was decided
before the Court held the first amendment applicable to the states.18
Moreover, Halter preceded the modem development of first amend-
ment interpretation. Nonetheless, virtually all of the reported cases
involving flag desecration between 1907 and 1968 led to convictions,
and often cited Halter as an authority.'82 Almost all of these cases
clustered around World Wars I and II, just as the next batch was to
center around Vietnam, presumably because a wartime atmosphere is
likely to elicit both impassioned protest and heightened patriotic sur-
177. Halter v. State, 74 Neb. 757, 762, 105 N.W. 298, 300 (1905), aff'd, 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
178. Halter, 205 U.S. at 41-43.
179. 394 U.S. 576 (1969); see infra notes 374-83 and accompanying text.
180. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2552 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2545 n.10 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 413 n.7 (1974)). The
Supreme Court held the first amendment applicable to the states in Gitlow v. New York, 286
U.S. 652, 657 (1925).
182. See infra notes 194-202, 210, 223 & 225-30 and accompanying text.
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veillance and repression.1 83
Shortly before American entry into World War I, Congress
passed a flag desecration law applicable to Washington, D.C. only,
184
and in the so-called Sedition Act of 1918,"85 language was included
which outlawed "disloyal, profane, scurrilous or abusive language"
about the "form of government," the Constitution, the military or its
uniforms, the "flag of the United States," or any language intended to
bring such into "contempt, scorn, contumely or disrepute."'18 6 On
April 9, 1917, three days after the United States entered the war,
Attorney General Gregory told federal attorneys and marshals to pro-
tect the public peace by "subject[ing] to summary arrest and confine-
ment" any alien enemy involved in flag desecration. 87 Although
there were few prosecutions or arrests for flag abuse under these fed-
eral statutes and pronouncements, a considerable amount of repres-
sive activity related to the flag occurred in the states during the period
leading up to American entry into the war as well as during the war
itself."'88 In mostly unreported cases, a number of people were
arrested for allegedly abusing the flag physically or orally.'8 9 For
example, a New York City minister was fined $100 and jailed thirty
days for each of two separate offenses in 1916 and 1917, resulting
from depicting the flag in an allegedly insulting way in an advertise-
ment for a lecture, and then burning a flag on the eve of his trial. 90
At trial, the judge asked the minister why he didn't "go and live in
some other country?'' 91 Another example involved an Indiana baker
who was fined five dollars in 1917 for saying "to hell with the flag" in
a local bar. 92 A New York City woman was jailed for six months in
1918 for displaying a German flag, hauling in an American flag which
a neighbor had placed in her window, and declaring, "To hell with
the American flag. I want my own flag."'
19 3
In State v. Shumaker,'94 a Kansas man was convicted for con-
temptuous verbal abuse of the flag uttered in a blacksmith shop while
183. See Prosser, supra note 122, at 160 ("The incidence of flag-desecration appears to be
greatest in the United States during times of national stress.").
184. Act of Feb. 8, 1917, ch. 34, 39 Stat. 900 (codified at 4 U.S.C. § 3 (1970)).
185. Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1921).
186. Id.
187. See Prosser, supra note 122, at 166.
188. Id. at 164.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 161.
191. Id. at 162.
192. Id. at 163-64.
193. Id. at 164-65.
194. 103 Kan. 741, 175 P. 978 (1918).
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others were present. 1' In affirming the conviction, the Kansas
Supreme Court held that the remarks were sufficiently public in
nature to bring them within the Kansas law, and declared that anyone
who used such language about the flag lacked the "respect for it that
should be found in the breast of every citizen of the United States." 196
In Ex parte Starr,197 a Montana man was arrested under the state's
war-time sedition act, which he allegedly violated by using language
"calculated to bring the flag into contempt and disrepute."' 98 He
allegedly refused a mob's demands that he kiss the flag (a favorite
wartime vigilante punishment for the allegedly disloyal)1 99 and
termed it "nothing but a piece of cotton with a little paint" which
"might be covered with microbes." 2" Starr was given a ten-to-twenty
year jail sentence, a penalty that an appellate judge, who declared he
was powerless to overturn, termed "horrifying." 10' The judge
declared that the sentence justified George Bernard Shaw's comment
that war hysteria had made the French courts "severe," the Engish
courts "grossly unjust," and the American courts "stark, staring, rav-
ing mad." 202
Immediately after World War I during the "red scare" of 1919 to
1920, thirty-two states passed laws which forebade the display of red
flags, regarded as the symbol of communism and revolution in the
aftermath of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.20 3 Most of these laws
were as vague as the New York statute, which outlawed displaying
red flags in any public gathering as a symbol of "any organization" or
in furtherance of "any political, social, or economic principle, doc-
trine or propaganda. ' '2° In the 1931 Stromberg v. California20 5 deci-
sion, the United States Supreme Court declared California's red flag
law unconstitutionally vague under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments. 2 6 The Court emphasized that the statutory language could be
improperly used to outlaw the use of red flags even to foster "peaceful
and orderly opposition to government by legal means and within con-
195. Id.
196. Id. at 741-42, 175 P. at 979.
197. 263 F. 145 (D. Mont. 1920).
198. Id.
199. See H. PETERSON & G. FITE, OPPONENTS OF WAR: 1917-1918, at 46, 84, 127, 152-53
& 196-97 (1957).
200. Ex parte Starr, 263 F. at 145.
201. Id. at 146-47.
202. Id. at 147.
203. See R. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919-1920, at 233-
34 (1955).
204. See id. at 234.
205. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
206. Id.
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stitutional limitations."2 °7 While not directly relevant to flag desecra-
tion per se, Stromberg was significant for the Court's recognition, for
the first time, that symbolic speech was protected by the first amend-
ment. It was also the first decision declaring a state law facially
unconstitutional on the basis of the first amendment.2 °8
Between World War I and 1940, there were only a handful of
flag desecration prosecutions, of which few have political significance.
In 1930, two young women who ran a communist children's camp in
Van Etten, New York, served jail terms of three months each for
allegedly "desecrating" the American flag by refusing to hoist one at
the order of a mob.20 9 In 1933, a radical speaker in Monticello, New
York, was charged with defiling the flag by allegedly blowing his nose
with it and wiping his face and clothing on it.210 The period of grow-
ing tension leading up to World War II and the American entry into
that struggle, however, triggered a wave of flag hysteria somewhat
comparable to the Johnson hysteria of 1989, although considerably
more violent. The background to this outbreak can be traced back to
the 1919 red scare and the 100% Americanism mentality of the
1920's. Support was provided by business organizations and patriotic
groups such as the American Legion, which frequently centered their
programs around reverance for the flag.2"' Specifically, the Legion
unceasingly complained about "abuse, misuses and desecration" 212 of
the flag, such as the "draping of unmounted flags over greasy, grimy,
dirty hoods, sides or tops of autos, "213 sponsored a conference of
sixty-eight patriotic organizations which met in 1923 to draft a uni-
form flag code (which eventually was codified by Congress in
1942),214 and circulated within a single year about 6.5 million copies
of a leaflet on flag etiquette. 215  Although New YQrk state had
required a daily flag salute in schools as early as 1898,216 the patriotic
propaganda of the 1920's coupled with fears over Bolshevism and the
suspect loyalties of immigrants greatly increased the spread of such
207. Id. at 369.
208. Id.
209. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE FIGHT FOR CIVIL LIBERTY, 1930-31,
at 14 (1931).
210. People v. Katzowitz, 150 Misc. 63, 267 N.Y.S. 748 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1933).
211. See R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note *, at 167-68.
212. W. PENCAK, FOR GOD & COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN LEGION, 1919-1941, at 289-90
(1989).
213. Id.
214. National Flag Code, 36 U.S.C. §§ 173-177 (1988); see W. PENCAK, supra note 212, at
290.
215. See D. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY 6
(1962); W. PENCAK, supra note 212, at 290.
216. D. MANWARING, supra note 215, at 5.
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patriotic rituals. By 1940, "[tlhe salute and pledge [of allegiance]
probably were in at least sporadic local use in every state" and patri-
otic flag rituals were required or encouraged by law in at least eight-
een states. 2 7 Even before 1940, there were a scattering'of cases in
which children were expelled from school, and in some cases, parents
were prosecuted for refusing on religious grounds to participate in
such rituals.218 In the most bizarre case, a Washington state father
was jailed in 1926 and his nine-year old son was taken away from him
and placed in state custody for over a year when the child refused to
salute the flag.219
The outbreak of World War II in 1939 Europe and the growing
likelihood of American involvement increased the emotion,
amimosity, and publicity surrounding incidents of alleged flag dese-
cration, especially regarding Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to
salute the flag in following the Biblical command to foreswear the
worship of "graven images. '220 Thus, in 1940 and 1941, before
American entry into the war, there were as many flag desecration
prosecutions as during the previous two decades. 221 For example, an
Italian alien in New York was fined fifty dollars for flying a flag from
an outhouse; 222 a German-born New Jersey woman received a one-to-
two year sentence in a reformatory for tearing a small flag from her
motorcyle and throwing it to the ground while reportedly proclaiming
her Nazi sympathies; 223 and another alleged Nazi sympathizer was
fined thirty dollars for spitting on a flag.224 A Maine man was con-
victed in 1940 for the bizarre "crime" of desecrating a non-existent
flag: he allegedly stated in a private home that the flag was "nothing
more than a piece of rag" which he would "strip" up and "trample" if
he had one, and accompanied these remarks by pantomine gestures of
tearing and stomping on an object.225 The Maine Supeme Court
reversed on the grounds that the offense had not occurred publicly as
the law required.226 In 1941, an Arkansas man received a one day jail
sentence and fifty dollar fine for refusing to salute the flag, and for
217. Id. at 4-5.
218. See generally id. at 11-16 (discussing cases dealing with children who refused to salute
the flag during school).
219. Id. at 13-14.
220. Exodus 20:3.
221. See Prosser, supra note 122, at 169.
222. Id.
223. State v. Schlueter, 127 N.J.L. 496, 23 A.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1941); see Prosser, supra note
122, at 169-70.
224. See Prosser, supra note 122, at 170.
225. State v. Peacock, 138 Me. 339, 341, 25 A.2d 491, 491 (1942).
226. Id. at 343, 25 A.2d at 493.
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calling it "a rag" without eyes, ears or a mouth.22 7 His conviction
was upheld on appeal on the grounds that he had publicly exhibited
"contempt for the United States flag." '22 8 In Connersville, Indiana,
seven Jehovah's Witnesss were prosecuted in 1940 for flag desecra-
tion, because they had circulated literature opposing compulsory
school flag saluting.229 Five pled guilty and received light sentences
while the two who pled not guilty faced new charges of "riotous con-
spiracy" which resulted in two-to-ten year jail terms.230 The Indiana
Supreme Court eventually overturned the convictions as completely
unsupported by the facts.231
As part of the growing wave of persecution, numerous Jehovah's
Witnesses were expelled from public schools during the immediate
pre-war period. By June 1940, school saluting disputes had developed
in at least twenty states, children had been expelled or threatened
with expulsion in sixteen states, and over 200 children had actually
been expelled, including over 100 in Pennsylvania alone.232 In this
atmosphere of growing hysteria, fueled by Nazi victories in 1940
against France and the Low Countries, the United States Supreme
Court decided Minersville School District v. Gobitis,23 3 which upheld
the legality of expelling children from school for refusing to salute the
flag on the grounds that the "flag is the symbol of our national
unity" 234 and that "[n]ational unity is the basis of national
security.
235
The Gobitis decision, along with American entry into the war in
December 1941, helped to foster many more expulsions of Jehovah's
Witness children and a large and often violent eruption of harass-
ment, beatings, and arrests of adult Witnesses-whose primary crime,
now officially endorsed, was their refusal to salute the flag. From
June 1935, to June 1943, a total of 2,000 school expulsions were
recorded, most of which occurred after the Gobitis decision.2 36 In
1941, the American Civil Liberties Union reported that between May
and October of 1940, almost 1,500 Witnesses had been the victims of
mob violence in 355 communities in 44 states and that no religious
227. Johnson v. State, 204 Ark. 476, 477, 163 S.W.2d 153, 153-54 (1942).
228. Id. at 477, 477, 163 S.W.2d at 154.
229. See D. MANWARING, supra note 215, at 166.
230. Id.
231. McKee v. State, 219 Ind. 247, 37 N.E.2d 940 (1941); see D. MANWARING, supra note
215, at 183.
232. D. MANWARING, supra note 215, at 56, 76 & 79.
233. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
234. Id. at 596.
235. Id. at 595.
236. D. MANWARING, supra note 215, at 163-86.
[Vol. 45:19
THE GREAT FLAG FLAP
organization had suffered such persecution "since the days of the
Mormons." '37 Witnesses reported about another 300 incidents and
200 arrests between December 1941 and December 1943.238 The
wave of terror against the Witnesses declined only with the interven-
tion of three key factors: the increasing protective intervention of the
Justice Department after mid-1942, the growing likelihood of an
Allied victory in the war, and the Supreme Court's reversal of Gobitis
with its landmark decision in West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette, 39 handed down on June 14 (Flag Day), 1943. On the same
day, in Taylor v. Mississippi,240 the Court invalidated a Mississippi
wartime law which outlawed using language which "reasonably tends
to create an attitude of stubborn refusal to salute, honor or respect the
flag, 241 and which had been used to convict three Witnesses.242
Only a scattering of flag desecration prosecutions occurred dur-
ing the American involvement in World War II. For example, a Wis-
consin man who pulled down the flag at the house of a policeman was
jailed for sixty days and fined $100 in 1942 by a judge who told him
that "nothing can be permitted to hinder" the war effort;243 a Chicago
man was fined $100 in 1944, in part for verbally abusing the flag;2
44
and a New York man was fined $50 in 1945 for displaying the flag in
a reversed position in his delicatessen window.2 45 For about twenty
years after the end of World War II, there were virtually no flag dese-
cration prosecutions.246 In one case which provided a precursor to
some of the bizarre penalties imposed in flag desecration cases during
the Vietnam War, two Illinois youths who were arrested in 1951 for
dragging a flag behind their automobile were ordered to recite the
Pledge of Allegiance in court, to study a book on flag etiquette, and to
attend public gatherings which featured flag ceremonies.247 In
another bizarre case, the distributors of an Illinois magazine were
convicted in 1958 for publishing a photograph of a young woman,
apparently naked except for a flag strategically placed over her pelvic
237. ACLU, LIBERTY'S NATIONAL EMERGENCY: THE STORY OF CIVIL LIBERTY IN THE
CRISIS YEAR 1940-1941, at 27-29 (1941).
238. R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note *, at 283.
239. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
240. 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
241. Id. at 584.
242. Id. at 586-90.
243. See Prosser, supra note 122, at 170-71.
244. See id. at 171.
245. See id. at 171-72.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 178.
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region.248 On appeal, however, the court ordered an acquittal on the
grounds that the Illinois law was designed to prevent breaches of the
peace, and that no such threat of breach had occurred.
2 49
C. The Vietnam War Flag Flap: Deja Vu
The Great 1989-1990 Flag Flap in many ways mimicked a simi-
lar controversy that had occurred during the height of American
involvement in Vietnam. Just as The Great 1989-1990 Flag Flap
grew as the result of a single flag burning by Joey Johnson in Dallas,
the Vietnam War Flag Flap similarly emerged as the result of a single
flag burning at New York's Central Park during an anti-war demon-
stration on April 15, 1967.230 Although there had been a few scat-
tered flag desecration incidents in the preceding year or so, the New
York burning, unlike the earlier incidents, was televised and widely
publicized. 251' Like the 1989 Johnson incident, it triggered a wave of
indignation, widespread demands for punitive legislation, and a hast-
ily drafted law which was essentially aimed at the prevention of dis-
sent and eventually emasculated by the Supreme Court.252 Within
three weeks of the Central Park flag burning, the House Judiciary
Committee began hearings on a total of over 100 bills, all nearly iden-
tical, which had been introduced to combat the menace posed by the
desecration. 5 3 This flurry of legislative activity occurred despite the
fact that all fifty states already had flag desecration laws on the
books.254 Within two months, on June 20, 1967, the House had
passed an anti-flag desecration measure by a 385-to-16 vote, which
was featured on the front page of the New York Times.2 15 As in the
1989 controversy, public interest in the issue quickly waned. Perhaps
this was a result of changing public attitudes towards the war after the
January 1968 Tet Offensive, together with the distracting impact of
other 1968 traumas, such as the assassinations of Senator Robert
Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. At any rate, by the time the
Senate passed the bill on June 24, 1968, the issue generated so little
interest that no legislative debate was held and the New York Times
reported the vote in a one-paragraph item on page thirty-two.
256
248. People v. von Rosen, 13 Il1. 2d 68, 69, 147 N.E.2d 327, 328 (1958).
249. Id. at 71, 147 N.E.2d at 329.
250. See Prosser, supra note 122, at 159 & nn.1-5.
251. Id. at 159-60.
252. See 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988).
253. See Hearings, supra note 126, at 1-27, 346-49 (reciting texts of proposed bills).
254. Id. at 324-46.
255. Hunter, House Acts to Make Mutilation of Flag a Federal Crime, N.Y. Times, June 21,
1967, at 1, col. 3.
256. Flag Burning Bill Voted, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1968, at 32, col. 3. When President
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The 1968 law made it illegal to "knowingly cast[] contempt upon
any flag of the United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling,
burning, or trampling upon it,"'257 subject to a penalty of up to $1000
and/or one year in jail.25 It defined "flag" in the expansive manner
typical of most of the state laws.25 9 The major arguments in support
of the law were similar to those advanced in 1989: The flag is a
unique and special symbol of America, and especially American free-
dom, and although the right to dissent is sacred, burning the flag sim-
ply goes "too far.''260 Thus, Congressman James Quillen declared
that the flag has "always been the symbol of freedom and liberty,"
'261
but there are bounds in which such freedom should be exercised and
"when anyone goes so fa.r as to desecrate our beloved flag ... he has
gone too far."'262 Congressman Richard Roudebush was one of many
who termed the flag "sacred," 26a and considered flag burning to raise
a serious threat to the country. Congressman Edna Kelley viewed
flag burning as a "direct attack on the sovereignty of the United States
[which] tears at the very core of our democratic society [and] is a
form of destruction of the basic values and principles of our Govern-
ment. ''261 Similarly, Congressman Jack Edwards declared that by
destroying the symbol of "the freedom of dissent which these skilled
agitators pretend to value ... they seek to destroy the country. 265
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Michael Musmanno declared,
"[T]hose who put a match to the flag of the United States apply an
acetylene torch to the police stations, courthouses and Federal and
State capitols. ' 266 Musmanno inadvertently explained exactly why
Johnson signed the bill, it was further relegated to one paragraph on page 40. Flag Burning
Bill Signed, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1968, at 40, col. 7.
257. 18 U.S.C. § 700(b) (1988).
258. Id. § 700(a).
259. The law defined a flag as:
[A]ny flag, standard colors, ensign, or any picture or representation of either, or
of any part or parts of either, made of any substance or represented on any
substance, of any size evidently purporting to be either of said flag, standard,
color or ensign of the United States of America, or a picture or a representation
of either, upon which shall be shown the colors, the stars and the stripes, in any
number of either thereof, or of any part or parts of either, by which the average
person seeing the same without deliberation may believe the same to represent
the flag, standards, colors or ensign of the United States of America.
Id. § 700(b).
1260. See infra notes 261-78 and accompanying text.
261. Hearings, supra note 126, at 29.
262. Id. at 32.
263. Id. at 55.
264. Id. at 46.
265. Id. at 63.
266. Id. at 70-71.
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suppressing flag burning was not an attempt to punish conduct, as
supporters of such measures claimed, but was in fact a direct assault
on freedom of expression by asking, "How could demonstrations
against American policy be more vividly and dramatically manifested
than by burning the very flag of the United States?"267 Many con-
gressmen, such as Representatives Seymour Halpern and Ray Rob-
erts, termed flag burning an act of treason.26
No description of flag burners or penalty for their offense could
be too harsh. According to various congressmen, flag burners were
"unshaven beatniks,"26 9 "rabble," 270 breeders of "anarchy,"' 271 "buz-
zards, '2 72 and "dirty, long-haired Communist-led beatniks. ' 273 Mus-
manno set some sort of record for invective in his House Judiciary
Committee testimony, terming flag burners variously "miserable
wretches," "vile America-hating hooligans," and "treasonous" agita-
tors "fit to conspire with Communists who would force our freedoms
into the straitjacket of Bolshevistic dictatorship. '274 "Nothing's too
strong for them, ' 275 declared House Armed Services Committee
Chairman Mendel Rivers, while Representative James Haley help-
fully suggested that authorities "[1]oad a boat full of them and take
them 500 miles out into the ocean and handcuff them, chain the
anchor around their necks and throw them overboard.
2 7 6
As in 1989, the smell of political pandering hung heavy over con-
gressional debate on the flag burning bill. One of the few congress-
men willing to publicly oppose the measure, Representative Robert
Kastenmeier, declared that since all states already had similar meas-
ures, among the main functions of the new law would be to "provide
empty rhetorical ammunition for the flag wavers" and "feed irrational
demands for conformity" amidst "a general climate of war hyste-
ria. "277 One anonymous congressman was quoted by Newsweek as
saying, "It's a great bill to vote for. We'll let the courts worry about
the Constitution. ' 278 Representative Emmanual Celler, the chairman
267. Id.
268. Id. at 105, 211.
269. Id. at 94 (quoting Representative Dan Kuykendall).
270. Id. at 133 (quoting Representative E.Y. Berry).
271. Id. at 185 (quoting Representative Albert Watson).
272. See Hunter, supra note 255, at 1, col. 3 (quoting Representative Mendel Rivers).
273. See Hot Summers and Short Tempers, 205 NATION 36, 37 (1967) (quoting
Representative Walter S. Baring).
274. Hearings, supra note 126, at 70-74.
275. Hunter, supra note 255, at 1, col. 3.
276. See Burning Issue, TIME, June 30, 1967, at 17.
277. H.R. REP. No. 350, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1967).
278. Burned Up, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1967, at 29.
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of the House Judiciary Committee and a liberal who termed the mea-
sure a "bad bill" of doubtful constitutionality, explained his ultimate
support for it by declaring, "Who can vote against something like
this? It's like motherhood. ' 27 9 In their rush to propose bills to ban
flag desecration, some congressmen did not even bother to understand
what their measures meant. Thus, the bill introduced by Representa-
tive Maston O'Neal and drafted by the congressional legislative coun-
sel's office made it illegal (as did many other bills) to "defy" the
flag.280 When the House Judiciary Committee asked O'Neal what
this meant, he confessed that "you have got me there," then opined
that he could "conceive of somebody standing on a platform and hurl-
ing one curse after another at the flag." '281
Just as the arguments for the 1968 law prefigured those advanced
for the 1989 Flag Protection Act, the arguments against it resembled
those to be advanced against similar proposals and constitutional
amendments twenty years later. Aside from criticizing the propo-
nents of the flag law for political pandering, opponents of the measure
stressed that flag desecration, although highly distasteful, was essen-
tially a political expression protected by the first amendment and that
no substantial state interests, unrelated to suppressing expression, jus-
tified forbidding such behavior. Thus, Representatives John Conyers
and Don Edwards protested that the proposed legislation "would do
more real harm to the Nation than all the flag burners can possibly
do" because it would "infringe upon what is certainly one of the most
basic freedoms, the freedom to dissent," which was clearly the "real
'evil' at which the bill was directed. 2 82 Commentators also argued
that banning flag desecration would begin a "slippery slope" of erod-
ing first amendment freedoms. Lawrence Speiser, director of the
ACLU's Washington office, told the House Judiciary Committee that
while the United States would not turn into a "dictatorship" with
passage of such a measure, "we [would] be less free than we were
before.
283
Critics of flag desecration legislation also argued that the handful
of flag burnings hardly justified congressional action, and that ban-
ning such behavior would protect little, but create martyrs, since the
flag was not the same as the country or the principles it symbolized.
Representative James Scheuer termed the bill "a classic kind of irre-
sponsible overkill" and declared that Congress "does not need to rise
279. N.Y. Times, June 7, 1967, at 21, col. 4.
280. See Hearings, supra note 126, at 68-69.
281. Id.
282. H.R. REP. No. 350, supra note 277, at 17.
283. Hearings, supra note 126, at 167.
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to meet the bait of every silly college kid who sets out to make a fool
of himself." '284 Representatives Conyers and Edwards, rejecting the
contention of the House Judiciary Committee that flag burning
"inflicts an injury on the entire Nation," instead declared that by
unconstitutionally suppressing dissent, legislation "can only result in
making dissent more widespread, more bitter and more valid.
'2 85
Whitney Smith, director of the Flag Heritage Association, declared
that the flag would be "respected when respectable, reviled when dis-
respectable," and that "no law, fine or jail term will coerce a man into
honoring a flag he believes to have been dishonored by the nation it
stands for."' 2 8 6 Commentators attacked the flag desecration issue as
distracting the country from real issues and "real" rather than "sym-
bolic" desecration of the country. Thus, Commonweal remarked sar-
castically, "Seeing as nothing can be done about the war in Vietnam
or rampant racism here, why not at at least begin with respect for the
flag?" 287 Similarly, the Christian Century lamented that "[w]hile our
Congress argues about people who burn a bit of bunting, the United
States scorches land, blows up humble homes and burns thousands of
people to death or until they pray to die. That, more than anything
else, desecrates our flag .. "288
The 1968 flag desecration bill did not end flag desecrations. In
fact, the 1968 to 1974 period saw an explosion of flag desecration
prosecutions unprecedented in American history. 289 Because many of
these cases were unreported, it is not clear how many such incidents
were brought to trial or what percentage of them were successfully
prosecuted. However, in September 1970, the ACLU reported that
nineteen new cases had reached its attention in the past few weeks,
and in May 1971, it reported that "easily 100 cases" were being han-
dled. 290 The ACLU reported in September 1970 that it was generally
"winning the cases," but a law review article pubished at about the
same time concluded that lower courts had "consistently upheld the
constitutionality of the state and federal statutes. '29 ' Law review
essays published in the early 1970's declared that "[s]tate courts ha[d]
284. Hunter, supra note 255, at 2, col. 4.
285. See Hearings, supra note 126, at 68-69.
286. See Hunter, supra note 255, at 1, col. 3.
287. Oh Say, Can You See. . ., COMMONWEAL, Oct. 18, 1968, at 77.
288. Who's Desecrating the Flag?, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, June 14, 1967, at 772.
289. Most of these prosecutions often were brought under newly revised and augmented
state laws rather than the new federal measure.
290. Civil Liberties, May 1971, at 5, col. 2.
291. Note, Freedom of Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Crime of Flag Desecration, 12
ARIz. L. REV. 71, 72-73 (1970); Flag Laws Still Wave, supra note 134, at 1, col. 1.
[Vol. 45:19
THE GREAT FLAG FLAP
traditionally upheld flag desecration convictions," 292 and that "the
majority of lower courts" had upheld the professed state interest in
protecting the flag as a symbol of the nation.293
The present author's comprehensive survey of nearly sixty
reported flag desecration cases which occurred between 1966 and
1989, nearly all of which arose before 1974, indicates that acquittals
ultimately resulted in about sixty percent of the cases. Such outcomes
were increasingly likely after 1972, when American ground combat
involvement in Vietnam had begun to decrease markedly and there
was a growing consensus that the war had been an error. Also,
acquittals were more likely when the allegations involved were rela-
tively less inflammatory, literally and figuratively, than flag burning,
such as wearing a "flag patch" on the seat of one's pants or displaying
a flag with the "peace sign" replacing the field of stars.294 The almost
sixty cases surveyed were roughly divided into four categories: burn-
ing the flag,295 wearing the flag (usually as a trouser's seat patch),296
superimposing symbols like the "peace sign" over the flag,297 and a
wide variety of miscellaneous charges which included publishing a
picture of a burning flag, 298 pouring paint over the flag,299 and dis-
playing the flag at half mast in an inferior position to the United
292. Comment, Flag Desecration as Constitutionally Protected Symbolic Speech, 56 IOWA L.
REV. 614 (1971).
293. Hicks, Spence v. Washington; Smith v. Goguen: Symbolic Speech and Flag
Desecraton, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 534, 544 (1974-75). For other law review articles
published on the Vietnam era cases, see generally Bogdan, Constitutional Prohibition of
Contemptuous Flag Burning Suppresses Constitutionally Protected Free Speech, 40 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1541 (1983); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Loewy,
Punishing Flag Desecrators: The Ultimate in Flag Desecration, 49 N.C.L. REV. 48 (1970);
Note, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-Desecration of National Symbols as Protected
Political Expression, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1040 (1968); Note, Constitutional Law-First
Amendment Rights--Flag Burnings as Symbolic Expression, 48 N.C.L. REV. 201 (1970); Note,
Flag Desecration Under the First Amendment: Conduct or Speech, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 119
(1971); Constitutional Law--Flag Desecration-Decal Superimposing Peace Symbol over
Representation of American Flag Not Within Scope of New York General Business Law § 136-a,
35 ALB. L. REV. 360 (1971); Comment, Flag Desecration: Illegal Conduct or Protected
Expression?, 22 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 555 (1971); Comment, Exploiting the American Flag:
Can the Law Distinguish Criminal from Patriot?, 30 MD. L. REV. 332 (1970); Comment,
Official Symbols: Use and Abuse, 1 N.M.L. REV. 352 (1971); and Comment, Flag Desecration
Statutes in Light of United States v. O'Brien and the First Amendment, 32 U. PITr. L. REV.
513 (1971). See also Annotation, What Constitutes Violation of Flag Desecration Statutes, 41
A.L.R. 3d 502 (1972).
294. See infra notes 316-17, 322-24 & 338-41 and accompanying text.
295. See infra notes 301-02, 312-15 & 340-41 and accompanying text.
296. See infra notes 303, 318-19, 322-24 & 328-30 and accompanying text.
297. See infra notes 316-17, 321, 328-33 & 338 and accompanying text.
298. Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970).
299. People v. Verch, 63 Misc. 2d 477, 311 N.Y.S.2d 637 (N.Y. Sp. Sess. 1970).
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Nations flag.300 The first category, consisting of flag burning charges,
invariably led to convictions,3° I at least until 1982.3°2 On the other
hand, almost all cases involving "superimposition" ultimately
resulted in acquittals.30 3 About sixty percent of the flag "wearing"
cases304 and a slight majority of the miscellaneous cases resulted in
acquittals. 3 5
Where prosecutions led to convictions, the courts generally relied
upon one or both of the same two alleged state interests to be put
forth by Texas in the Johnson case: protecting the flag as a symbol of
the nation, thereby furthering the state's interest by fostering unity
and patriotism; and/or preventing breaches of the peace. For exam-
ple, in Deeds v. State,3 °6 a 1972 Texas flag burning case whose author-
ity was later rejected by the same Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in
Johnson in 1988,307 the court declared that "since the flag symbolizes
the entire nation, not just one particular philosophy, the state may
determine that it be kept above the turmoil created by competing ide-
ologies. ' 308  In upholding flag desecration convictions as legitimate
300. Hodsdon v. Buckson, 310 F. Supp. 528 (D. Del. 1970).
301. United States v. Kime, 673 F.2d 1318 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 949 (1982);
United States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); United
States v. Ferguson, 302 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1969); People v. Sutherland, 29 Ill. App. 3d
199, 329 N.E.2d 820 (1975), reh'g denied, 426 U.S. 942 (1976); State v. Farrell, 223 N.W.2d
270 (Iowa 1974), appeal dismissed, 421 U.S. 1007 (1975); People v. Burton, 27 N.Y.2d 198,
316 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1970), appeal denied, 402 U.S. 991 (1971); Deeds v. State, 474 S.W.2d 718
(Tex. Crim. App. 1971). The only reported exception was the acquittal, on grounds of lack of
scienter, in State v. Turner, 78 Wash. 2d 276, 474 P.2d 91 (1970).
302. After 1982, but before Johnson, the only two reported flag burning cases also
ultimately led to acquittals on grounds similar to those in Johnson. See Bowles v. Jones, 758
F.2d 1479 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Monroe v. Fulton Co., 739 F.2d 568 (1 1th Cir. 1984). In Monroe,
the court held that the professed state interest in protecting the flag "as a symbol of the nation
... is not sufficiently substantial as to justify infringement of Monroe's constitutional rights"
and that the flag burning in that case "did not produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil" that could have justified arrest for breach of the peace. Monroe, 739 F.2d at
574-75.
303. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (peace sign over the flag); State v.
Kool, 212 N.W.2d 518 (Iowa 1973) (hanging a peace symbol in front of upside-down flag);
State v. Liska, 32 Ohio App. 2d 317, 291 N.E.2d 498 (1971) (peace sign over a decal composed
of 13 red and white stripes and a blue square); Commonwealth v. Hanoff, 439 Pa. 212, 266
A.2d 657 (1969) (words placed on flag).
304. See, e.g., Royal v. New Hampshire, 531 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 867 (1976); Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D.N.C. 1971); State v. Kasnett, 34
Ohio St. 2d 193, 297 N.E.2d 537 (1973). Convictions were obtained, however, in some cases.
See, e.g., People v. Cowgill, 274 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 923, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (Dep't Super. Ct.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 371 (1970); State v. Waterman, 190 N.W.2d 809 (Iowa 1971).
305. See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text; infra notes 325-27 & 342-43 and
accompanying text.
306. 474 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
307. Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92, 95-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
308. Deeds, 474 S.W.2d at 721.
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attempts to prevent breaches of the peace, Vietnam era courts often
cited a phrase from the 1907 Supreme Court decision in Halter, which
declared, "It has often occurred that insults to a flag have been the
cause of war, and indignities put upon it, in the presence of those who
revere it, have often been resented and sometimes punished on the
spot.""3°9 Thus, in State v. Waterman,310 an Iowa court upheld a con-
viction for wearing the flag as a cape, even without any evidence of
actual or threatened disorder, declaring that the state's interest in
"preventing breaches of the peace which result from reactions to any
attempted defilement of the flag has long been recognized." '' Simi-
larly, in Sutherland v. DeWulf,3 2 a federal court declared that public
flag burning had a "high likelihood" of causing a breach of the peace
and was inherently an act of incitement as "fraught with danger ... as
if a person would stand on the street comer shouting derogatory
remarks at passing pedestrians.
31 3
Acquittals were based on a wide variety of reasons, some of
which directly rejected the professed state's interests referred to
above. In Crosson v. Silver,3 14 a federal court acquitted a flag burner
partly on the grounds of rejecting "the existence of a constitutionally
recognized state power to prohibit flag desecration based on an inter-
est in preserving loyalty or patriotism. ' ' 31 5 In State v. Kool,316 the
Iowa Supreme Court, reversing a conviction in a case involving the
superimposition of a peace sign over the flag, rejected any claimed
threat to the peace, stating that although someone might have been
"so intemperate as to disrupt the peace because of this display, [if]
absolute assurance of tranquillity is required we might as well forget
about free speech. 3 1 7 A number of the convictions involving wearing
of flags and "superimposition" of flags were reversed on the grounds
that no real desecration had occurred or that no "contempt" had been
displayed. Some examples include wearing the flag as a cape, 1 ' wear-
ing a shirt resembling the flag, 1 9 substituting dollar signs for the flag's
309. See Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 41 (1907). However, a comprehensive study of
flag desecration incidents between 1915 and 1969 uncovered only 15 incidents of actual or
"threshold" breaches of the peace in a total of 95 cases. Prosser, supra note 122, at 203, 218.
310. 190 N.W.2d 809 (Iowa 1971).
311. Id. at 811.
312. 323 F. Supp. 740 (S.D. Ill. 1971).
313. Id. at 745.
314. 319 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Ariz. 1970).
315. Id. at 1087.
316. 212 N.W.2d 518 (Iowa 1973).
317. Id. at 521.
318. See, e.g., State v. Saion, 23 Ohio App. 2d 79, 261 N.E.2d 135 (1969).
319. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (charging activist
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stars,32° and displaying a peace sign superimposed over the flag.32'
Many Vietnam era courts struck down state flag desecration laws
as unconstitutional, in whole or in part, on the grounds of vagueness
or overbreadth. In Smith v. Goguen,322 where an individual was con-
victed of violating the Massachusetts flag-misuse statute for wearing a
flag patch sewn to the seat of his trousers, the United States Supreme
Court struck down the statute as unconsitutionally vague.323 The
Court determined that the statute, which outlawed "contemputously"
treating the flag in public, failed to adequately define "contemptuous
treatment. 324 In Hodsdon v. Buckson,325 where an individual sought
relief from prosecution for displaying the flag at half mast and in an
inferior position to the United Nations flag, a federal district court
found Delaware's flag desecration law unconstitutionally overbroad
since the statute encompassed "acts which bear no relation to any
interest within the legislative competence and which are intended and
understood as symbolic speech. ' 326 The court concluded that "the
punishment of peaceful symbolic acts rejecting the political ideals
bespoken by the flag is as alien to the mandate of the First Amend-
ment as is compulsion to signify adherence. 327 In Parker v. Mor-
gan, 3 2 a case involving wearing a jacket with a sewn-on flag which
had the words "Give peace a chance" superimposed on it, a federal
district court found North Carolina's law unconstitutionally vague by
virtue of its definition of "flag. ' 32 9 The court declared:
The definition of a flag in North Carolina is simply unbelievable
.... Read literally, it may be dangerous in North Carolina to
possess anything red, white and blue. Such a definition is a mani-
fest absurdity. Since it is not suggested that the state has the slight-
est interest in singling out from the spectrum certain colors for
unique protection, this definition alone is enough to void the stat-
ute .... 330
Abbie Noffman). Upon his original conviction, Hoffman lamented, "I regret that I have only
one shirt to give to my country." N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1968, at 52, col. 8.
320. See, e.g., State v. Kent, No. 36,423 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 9, 1966).
321. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); see infra notes 388-96 and
accompanying text.
322. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
323. Id. at 569.
324. Id. at 578-86.
325. 310 F. Supp. 528 (D. Del. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, Hodsdon v. Stabler, 444 F.2d
533 (3d Cir. 1971).
326. Id. at 534.
327. Id. at 535.
328. 322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
329. Id. at 593. North Carolina's statute was quite similar to many flag desecration laws
from other states and the 1968 federal law.
330. Id. at 588.
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In Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Committee v. Cahn,331 where an
individual had been prosecuted for having buttons and decals which
superimposed the "peace sign" over a portion of the flag, a federal
court of appeals held that the section of New York's law which
banned placing any "word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing, or
any advertisment, of any nature" on the flag violated the first amend-
ment because it was unconstitutionally overbroad.33 2 The court
stated:
Because of its overbreadth, the statute vests local law enforcement
officers with too much arbitrary discretion in determining whether
or not a certain emblem is grounds for prosecution. It permits
only that expression which local officals will tolerate; for example,
it permits local officials to prosecute peace demonstators but to
allow "patriotic" organizations and political candidates to go
unprosecuted.333
As Cahn suggests, the Vietnam era flag desecration prosecutions
were cast amongst a backdrop of chaotic, highly discretionary law
enforcement actions, and notably inconsistent court decisions. For
example, three cases dealing with wearing the flag as a cape,334 a
vest,335 and a patch on the seat of the pants336 led to convictions, but
in three other cases the same behaviors led to acquittals.337 A peace
sign superimposed on the flag's field of stars invariably led to acquit-
tal,338 but superimposition of a picture of Mickey Mouse over the flag
led to conviction. 339 Before 1982, burning the flag almost invariably
led to conviction,3" ° but after 1982, the same action consistently
culminated in acquittal. 34' Displaying the flag over the artistic repre-
sentation of an erect penis led to an acquittal in 1974,342 but rubbing
the flag over the genitals and using it as a handkerchief led to
331. 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1970).
332. Id. at 350.
333. Id.
334. See, e.g., State v. Waterman, 190 N.W.2d 809 (Iowa 1971).
335. See, e.g., People v. Cowgill, 274 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 923, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 371 (1970).
336. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 32 Ohio App. 2d 16, 288 N.E.2d 216 (1972).
337. See, e.g., People v. Vaughan, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 318 (1973); State v. Saion, 23
Ohio App. 2d 79, 261 N.E.2d 135 (1969); Franz v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 587, 186 S.E.2d
71 (1972).
338. See Long Island Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1973).
339. See State v. Saulino, 29 Ohio Misc. 25, 277 N.E.2d 580 (1974).
340. See supra note 301-02.
341. See supra note 302-04.
342. See United States ex rel. Radich v. Criminal Court of New York, 385 F. Supp. 165
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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conviction. 34
Much social commentary during this era focused on the arbitrary
and somewhat hypocritical manner by which prosecutors enforced
these flag desecration statutes. Thus, while "peace" demonstrators
were prosecuted for statutory violations, "patriotic" figures who wore
flag lapels and who placed flag decals on their windows and cars,
often in technical violation of flag desecration statutes, invariably
were free from prosecution.3 " The director of the Flag Research
Center, Whitney Smith, noted in 1970 that "commercial misuse" of
the flag was "more extensive than its misuse by leftists or students,
but this is overlooked because the business interests are part of the
establishment. ' 345 Time magazine, reporting in the same year on
prosecutions for "wearing" the flag, noted that in applying such logic,
"Uncle Sam should be indicted first, followed by Roy Rogers and
Dale Evans" 34 6 (the latter had appeared on national television wear-
ing flag costumes). In 1971, The New York Times reported that flag
desecration laws, despite being so broad that they could be used to
punish virtually any alleged "abuse" of the flag, "have rarely been
invoked against anyone except those who differ with prevailing ideas
of patriotism. '347 In fact, the Times reported that many cases
involved "rebellious young people [arrested] for improper display of
the flag on their clothing by policemen wearing flag patches or pins on
their uniforms ....
On occasion, the courts explicitly recognized the discriminatory
manner by which states enforced their respective flag desecration stat-
utes during this era. In one case, a Topeka, Kansas, man was arrested
for having a "peace flag" decal on his car, but the charge was dropped
after his lawyer pointed out that city police cars bore flag decals
"defaced" by a "love it or leave it" slogan.349 In Smith v. Goguen,3 50
the Supreme Court noted the candid concession of the state's attorney
from Massachusetts in admitting that a "war protester who, while
attending a rally at which it begins to rain, contemptuously covers
343. See Van Slyke v. State, 489 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), appeal dismissed, Van
Slyke v. Texas, 418 U.S. 907 (1974).
344. See generally Who Owns the Stars and Stripes?, TIME, July 6, 1970, at 8; Americana:
New Glory, NEWSWEEK, June 15, 1970, at 30.
345. See Hunter, supra note 255, at 1, col. 3.
346. See Who Owns the Stars and Stripes, supra note 344, at 15.
347. Graham, The Flag: Chaos over the Issue ofIts Abuse, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1971, § 4
(Magazine), at 10.
348. Ripley, The American Flag: A Center of Dispute on Birthday of US., N.Y. Times, July
5, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
349. Who Owns the Stars and Stripes, supra note 344, at 14.
350. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
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himself" with the flag, would be prosecuted, while "a member of the
American Legion who, caught in the same rainstorm while returning
from an 'America-Love It or Leave It' rally, similarly uses the flag,
but does so regrettably, and without a contemptuous attitude, would
not be prosecuted."35
D. The Supreme Court and the Flag Desecration
Issue Before Johnson
In its 1931 Stromberg v. California352 decision, the Supreme
Court first indicated that "symbolic speech" was, in some cases and to
some degree, protected under the first amendment.353 It failed, how-
ever, then and subsequently, clearly to define symbolic speech or to
outline the extent of the protection it enjoys. This was especially true
in flag desecration cases where, until Texas v. Johnson,354 the Court
three times reversed flag burning convictions while refusing directly
to address whether flag desecration constituted symbolic speech. 355
Beginning with Stromberg, in which an individual was convicted
for displaying a red flag as an emblem in opposition to organized gov-
ernment, 356 the Court established that freedom of speech extends
beyond purely verbal utterances to encompass also, at least to some
degree, conduct with symbolic overtones. 357  The Court used this
principle to protect under the first amendment the refusal to salute
the American flag, 58 the right peacefully to picket in labor dis-
putes, 359 the right to parade in support of civil rights, 36° and the right
to wear black armbands to school to oppose the Vietnam War.361 The
Court not only views such conduct as essentially communicative in
nature, but has noted that symbolic speech might be the only way for
relatively powerless individuals to gain public attention and support.
In Milkwagon Driver's Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,362 the
Court observed that "[p]eaceful picketing is the working man's means
351. Id. at 575.
352. 283 U.S. 259 (1931).
353. Id.
354. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
355. See infra notes 373-97 and accompanying text.
356. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 359.
357. Id. at 363.
358. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
359. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
360. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
361. The Court stated that wearing armbands was "closely akin to 'pure speech'" where no
disruption was involved because "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
362. 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
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of communication."363 Justice Douglas's dissent in Adderley v. Flor-
ida 36 added support to this proposition by noting that:
Conventional methods of petitioning may be, and often have been,
shut off to large groups of our citizens. ... Those who do not
control television and radio, those who cannot afford to advertise
in newspapers or circulate elaborate pamphlets may have only a
more limited type of access to public officials. Their methods
should not be condemned as tactics of obstruction and harassment
as long as the assembly and petition are peaceful.365
Although recognizing the concept of symbolic speech, the Court
has suggested that such "conduct" may not enjoy as much protection
under the first amendment as "pure speech." In its 1965 Cox v. Loui-
siana 36 6 decision, for example, the Court declared, "We emphatically
reject the notion .. . that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate
ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing ... as
these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure
speech. 367 Later, in United States v. O'Brien,368 the Court upheld a
criminal conviction under a 1965 draft card burning statute369 declar-
ing that "[w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless
variety of conduct can be labelled 'speech.' ",370 The Court set forth a
balancing test to determine when the government constitutionally
could regulate expressive conduct:
[W]hen "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the
same course of conduct.., a government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further-
371ance of that interest.
The statute in O'Brien was constitutional because the Court found it
was designed to foster effective functioning of the draft, not to hinder
363. Id. at 293.
364. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
365. Id. at 50-51.
366. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
367. Id. at 555.
368. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
369. This legislation clearly was intended to suppress a form of widely publicized dissent as
reflected in the congressional debates in which draft card burners were called filthy beatniks,
communist stooges, and traitors. See R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note *, at 435.
370. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
371. Id. at 377.
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free expression.372
Rather than resolving the issue of when expressive conduct
deserved first amendment protection, application of the O'Brien test
resulted in inconsistent lower court opinions because the Supreme
Court failed clearly to define critical terms of its test.3 73 Further, the
Court itself often failed to apply O'Brien in later opinions, preferring
to resolve flag desecration issues on narrow grounds rather than
addressing the state's interest in curbing expressive conduct. In Street
v. New York,37 4 for example, a flag burner was arrested in the after-
math of the 1966 shooting of civil rights activist James Meredith.375
Street had accompanied his symbolic protest with the oral declama-
tion, "If they let that happen to Meredith, we don't need an American
flag."'376 The Court reversed Street's conviction by a 5-to-4 vote on
the ground that he had been charged under a state statutory provision
forbidding casting "contempt upon ... [the flag] either by words or
act,"13 77 and that it was possible that Street had been convicted solely
for his words a.3 7  Explaining that the "public expression of ideas may
not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to
some," 379 the Court held Street's conviction to be a violation of the
first amendment. 3 ° Further, the Court noted that "the 'right to differ
as to things that touch the heart of the existing order,' encompass[es]
the freedom to express publicly one's opinions about the flag, includ-
ing those opinions which are defiant or contemptuous. "381 By focus-
ing on the pure speech aspects of Street's conduct, the Court avoided
the physical flag desecration issue despite a vigorous dissent.382
Although evading the physical flag desecration issue, Street estab-
lished that flag abuse involving "public expression of ideas" is consti-
tutionally protected. 83
372. Id. at 386.
373. The Court failed to define "free expression," "incidental," "essential," "important,"
and "furtherance."
374. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
375. Id.
376. Id. at 579.
377. Id. at 578 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1425(16)(d) (1909)).
378. Id. at 590.
379. Id. at 592.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 593 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
382. The dissent clearly would have upheld the constitutionality of a flag burning
conviction. Id. at 605, 610, 615 & 617 (Warren, Black, White, and Fortas, JJ., dissenting).
383. Id. at 592. New York also contended that Street's conviction should have been upheld
under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), because flag abuse would tend to
breach the peace. Id. In Chaplinsky, the Court held that:
[Personal insults that] by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace... are no essential part of an exposition of ideas,
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The Court reversed two other flag desecration convictions during
the Vietnam era, again without addressing the validity of the state's
interests in protecting the physical integrity of the flag under the
O'Brien test. In Smith v. Goguen,as4 a Massachusetts man was con-
victed under a state statute385 for treating the flag "contemptuously"
by wearing a flag patch on his trousers.38 6 The Court reversed by a 6-
to-3 vote, holding the statute unconstitutionally vague.387 In Spence
v. Washington,3 1 the Court reyersed a conviction, again by a 6-to-3
vote, for taping a peace symbol to the flag.38 9 The Court assumed
without analysis that there might have been a state interest in "pre-
serving the national flag as an unalloyed symbol of our country, ' ' 39°
but concluded that no such interest had been harmed because Spence
had not "permanently disfigure[d] the flag [n]or destroy[ed] it."39 1 In
a bitter dissent, Justice Rehnquist asked whether the majority's result
would have been the same if Spence had "subsequently tor[n] the flag
in the process of trying to take the tape off."
3a92
The Spence decision contained a highly significant point in a
footnote in which the Court declared that if Washington state had an
interest in preserving the symbolic value of the flag, such an interest
was "directly related to expression"393 and involved "no other govern-
ment interest unrelated to expression ... in the context of activity like
that undertaken" 394 by Spence. Thus, the statute would not have
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.
Id. at 572.
Rather than holding Street's remarks to be within the Chaplinsky exception, however, the
Court applied the principle of Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), that a func-
tion of free speech is "to invite dispute ... [and that] it may indeed best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are or
even stirs people to anger." Id. at 4; cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 & 25 (1971)
(reversing a conviction for disturbing the peace for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck
the Draft," noting that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (declaring that even advocacy could not be punished "except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.").
384. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
385. Id.
386. Id. at 568.
387. Id.
388. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
389. Id.
390. Id. at 412.
391. Id. at 415.
392. Id. at 420 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
393. Id. at 414 n.8.
394. Id. at 415.
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been subject to the O'Brien balancing test used with conduct mixed
with expression, but rather could have been subjected to much stricter
protection accorded pure expression.395 Although the Court was not
addressing flag burning, this was the first time3 96 it had stated clearly
that symbolic protest utilizing the American flag could be considered
a matter of pure expression.397
Two factors led to lower court confusion as to whether flag dese-
cration constituted protected symbolic speech under the first amend-
ment. First, the Court's holdings in Street, Goguen, and Spence
signaled the Court's reluctance both to uphold flag abuse or desecra-
tion convictions and to apply the O'Brien test to determine whether
the state had a sufficient interest to regulate flag desecration. How-
ever, the Court refused to grant certiorari in flag burning cases for
twenty years39 -from the 1969 Street decision until the 1989 Texas v.
Johnson decision.399 In one case, Justice Brennan wrote a blistering
critique of the Court's refusal to grant certiorari. In United States v.
Kime,4°° a flag burner had been convicted after a peaceful political
protest under the 1968 federal law forbidding "knowingly cast[ing]
contempt" 4° upon the flag. Applying Spence, Brennan declared that
the flag burning was clearly expressive in nature4°2 and that the only
possible government motive in banning such behavior was to suppress
expression which challenged the government's interest in fostering the
flag's symbolic value.4 3 Basing his argument on the proposition that
there could be "no aesthetic or property interest in protecting a mere
aggregation of stripes and stars for its own sake,"'  Brennan declared
that the terms of the 1968 federal law made the crime totally depen-
dent upon expression of a particular viewpoint." 5 He archly noted,
"This is indeed a narrowly drawn statute; it is drawn so that every-
thing it might possibly prohibit is constitutionally protected expres-
395. Id. at 414 n.8.
396. Id. at 416.
397. Also tucked away in the Spence decision was the Court's first real guideline for
determining when conduct could constitute expression. Id. at 410-11. The Court suggested
that expression might be defined as occurring when "an intent to convey a particularized
message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it." Id.
398. The Court refused to grant certiorari in United States v. Kime, 459 U.S. 949 (1982);
Sutherland v. Illinois, 425 U.S. 947 (1976); and Farrell v. Iowa, 421 U.S. 1007 (1975).
399. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
400. 459 U.S. 949 (1982).
401. Id. at 954 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988)) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
402. Id. at 950.




UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
sion." 6 Even the Greensboro Daily News captured the point that
Brennan's eight colleagues missed:
Across the land the flag is honored and well-kept. That a few rag-
tag radicals would destroy a flag in public does nothing to diminish
what the flag stands for. It is curious that the high court's decision
in effect protects only the symbol of the country-the flag-and
not the essence of it-freedom and free speech. Curious, and
regrettable. 4° 7
Three other pre-Johnson decisions rendered in the 1970-to-1988
period, although non-flag related, established or reinforced legal prin-
ciples which were important both for resolution of the issues raised in
Johnson, as well as for the subsequent attempt to circumvent Johnson
by legislation. First, in 1970, in Schacht v. United States,"8 the Court
invalidated a law prohibiting the unauthorized use of military
uniforms in dramatic productions when such use "tend[ed] to dis-
credit"'  the military, holding that a law discriminating on the basis
of content of expression could not survive first amendment scru-
tiny.41 ° Second, in 1988, in Boos v. Barry,4 1' the Court invalidated a
statute outlawing picketing close to embassies if picket signs tended to
bring the foreign government into "public odium . . . or . . .disre-
pute," 2 holding that the statute impermissibly focused "only on the
content of the speech and ... [its] direct impact ...on its listen-
ers. ' 413 Moreover, the Court declared that "in public debate our own
citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order
to provide 'adequate "breathing space" to the freedoms protected by
the First Amendment.' "414 Third, in 1980, in Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Service Commission,415 the Court reversed the New York
Public Service Commission's order forbidding Consolidated Edison
from inserting political messages, including those relating to nuclear
power, in monthly bills.4" 6 The Court held that even though all such
messages were forbidden by the Commission's order, regardless of
content, "[tlhe First Amendment's hostility to content-based regula-
406. Id.
407. T. TEDFORD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (1985) (quoting
Greensboro Daily News, Oct. 23, 1982, at A12, col. 1).
408. 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
409. Id. at 62-63.
410. Id. at 60 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 772(f) (1956)).
411. 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988).
412. Id. at 1161 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1115 (Michie 1981)).
413. Id.
414. Id. at 1164 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 (1988)).
415. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
416. Id.
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tion extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also
to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic. ' 417 Further, the
Court "rejected the suggestion that a government may justify a con-
tent-based prohibition by showing that [the] speakers have alternative
means of. expression."41
E. The Prelude to Johnson
Two developments during the year preceding Johnson signaled
the highly emotive response that flag burning was likely to invoke in
the American public. In the 1988 presidential campaign, then-Vice-
President Bush thrust the flag issue before the voters by criticizing
Michael Dukakis41 9 fo:. vetoing, as governor of Massachusetts in
1977, a law requiring daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance to
the flag in public schools.42° Although Dukakis vetoed the law based
on the advice of Massachusetts' highest court that the law was uncon-
stitutional under Barnette,42 Bush used it effectively to impugn
Dukakis's patriotism. Bush asked at one point, "What is it about the
American flag that upsets this man so much?" '422 Dukakis's response,
although legally correct, was "politically devastating. 42 3 At the
same time, Bush was elevating his own political status by leading
audiences' in mass recitals of the Pledge, surrounding his campaign
with flags, and visiting a flag factory. One reporter noted wryly,
"[F]lags surround . . . [Bush] on the stump like flowers at a Mafia
funeral." '424 Another characterized Bush's campaign as "a cross-
country version of [the children's game] 'capture the flag.' "425
A second flag-related development preceding Johnson was a
heated dispute over a Chicago art exhibit in February and March
1989. This dispute surely must have impressed upon politicians that
the flag issue had not disappeared with the presidential election.1
26
417. Id. at 537.
418. Id. at 541 n.10.
419. See generally J. GERMOND & J. WITCOVER, WHOSE BROAD STRIPES AND BRIGHT
STARS? THE TRIVIAL PURSUIT OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1988 (1989); P. GOLDMAN & T.
MATHEWS, THE QUEST FOR THE PRESIDENCY: THE 1988 CAMPAIGN (1989).
420. See Opinion of the Justices to'the Governor, 372 Mass. 874, 363 N.E.2d 251 (1977).
421. Id.
422. Flag Burning and Flag Waving, THE ECONOMIST, July 1, 1989, at 19.
423. Toner, Politics: Democrats, in a Flurry of Bills, Seek to Recapture the Flag Issue from
the Foe, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1989, at B6, col. 5.
424. Cohen, Whose Flag is it Anyway?, Wash. Post, Oct. 13, 1988, at A19, col. 1.
425. Gerstenzang, 'Capture the Flag' a Vital Game in '88 Campaign, L.A. Times, Sept. 21,
1988, at A13, col. 1.
426. Wilkerson, The Art Institute of Chicago Under Fire, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1989, at A13,
col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 22, 1989, at B8, col. 1; Schmidt, Disputed Exhibit of Flag Is Ended,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1989, at A19, col. 1.
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The exhibit included a display entitled "What is the Proper Way to
Display the American Flag?" '427 It featured a photograph collage of
flag burnings and flag-draped coffins. A flag was positioned on the
floor in front of a ledger in a manner that invited patrons to walk on it
in order to record their responses to the display. The exhibit sparked
a storm of controversy in Chicago in which thousands of people pick-
eted, and which a British magazine referred to as Chicago's "own
little Rushdie affair."42 This controversy caused the Illinois and
Indiana legislatures to condemn the display and to pass resolutions
eliminating funding to the school and banning placement of the flag
on the floor.
Bush's campaign success with the flag issue clearly influenced the
1989 congressional debate during the Johnson controversy. By
demanding passage of a constitutional amendment to overturn John-
son, Bush was attempting again to capture the flag for the Republican
Party. Democrats, still stinging from the 1988 campaign and fearing
negative advertisements in upcoming elections, feared appearing less
than 100% patriotic and thus refused to support the Johnson decision.
One reporter noted that "[m]any Democrats swore they would never
be outflagged again. "429 Although opposing a constitutional amend-
ment, Democrats led the fight for passage of a statute as a swift means
of circumventing Johnson while leaving the first amendment intact.
This political maneuver enabled Democrats to join Republicans in
blasting the Supreme Court for its decision. As the Washington Post
reported, congressional Democrats "kept up a fusillade of pro-flag
rhetoric ... matching the Republicans word for word" 430 and "talked
bar-room tough, essentially saying no Republican had better call them
soft on the flag.
''431
Democrats made no secrets of their political fears. Kentucky
State Democratic Senator Roger Noe declared, "Given the kind of
mud-slinging being used these days, I can envision seeing campaign
ads with opponents who were not strongly supportive of the amend-
ment being pictured as communist or pinko or un-American. "432 In
order to "avoid what he termed the 'deathtrap for Democrats,' " Cali-
427. Protecting the Flag, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 1989, at 32.
428. Id.
429. See Toner, supra note 423, at B6, col. 5.
430. Phillips & Dewar, Senate Votes to Rewrite Law Against Flag Desecration, Wash. Post,
June 24, 1989, at A17, col. 1.
431. Phillips & Dewar, Democrats Brace for Real Battle over Symbolism, Wash. Post, June
28, 1989, at AS, col. 1.
432. Nance, Flag Burning Issue Spurs Anger, Fear, Lexington (Ky.) Herald-Leader, June
30, 1989, at BI, col. 1.
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fornia State Senate Democratic majority leader Barry Keene voted for
a resolution supporting a constitutional amendment to ban flag burn-
ing,4 33 as did former anti-Vietnam war radical and now California
assemblyman Tom Hayden.434 Keene declared that the principal flag
desecrators were George Bush and Republican National Committee
Chairman Lee Atwater4 35 and that the real desecration of the flag was
the "shameful, cynical, tawdry, manipulative exploitation of the flag
for political purposes. 4 36 Keene, however, lamented that "[t]hey
know that their political trick will succeed because we can't take the
risk of being thought to be unpatriotic. 4 37  Under these circum-
stances, the major focus in the aftermath of Johnson, at least among
politicians, became how, not whether, to override the Court. The fun-
damental constitutional principles involved in the Court's decisions
were virtually neglected as both parties battled to demonstrate their
patriotism.
IV. THE DEBATE OVER JOHNSON
For the sake of both conciseness and comprehensiveness, this
Essay will summarize the key arguments for and against the Supreme
Court decision in Johnson by synthesizing points made (1) in the legal
briefs and oral arguments in the case, (2) in the various opinions writ-
ten by the Justices of the Court, and (3) in the general media. By
presenting the arguments for both sides, I do not pretend to remain
neutral. Although I have attempted to present fairly both positions, I
view the arguments of Johnson's opponents as hopelessly inadequate,
both from a legal standpoint and from a standpoint based on demo-
cratic theory. Conversely, I view the arguments of Johnson's support-
ers generally to be cogent and soundly based in law and democratic
principles.
A. The Arguments for Texas
In the end, both the legal and popular arguments made for
upholding Johnson's conviction in particular, and banning flag dese-
433. Ingram, State Senate Jumps on Bandwagon for the Flag, L.A. Times, July 14, 1989, at
A3, col. 5.
434. See Legislators Supporting Flag Move, supra note 66, at 6, col. 1.
435. Id.
436. See Ingram, supra note 433, at A3, col. 5.
437. Id. Compare the comments of Pennsylvania Democratic minority leader Senator John
Dent, concerning an "anti-communist" bill that he personally opposed during the height of
"McCarthism" in 1951: "I would be derelict in my duties to the Democratic Party if I did not
vote for this piece of legislation today.... I cannot permit my party to be further stigmatized
as a party-friendly to un-American activities." See R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note *, at 367.
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cration in general, either by law or constitutional amendment, are
grounded in the proposition that the flag, as the most popular symbol
of freedom and of the nation, is unique and that while dissent is a
legitimate and critical part of the democratic process, desecrating the
flag goes too far. For example, Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole
declared, "Freedom of speech is a constitutional guarantee that
America holds dear. But we draw the line when it comes to our
flag."43 President Bush proclaimed that he felt "viscerally about
burning the American flag"4 39 because it is "a unique national sym-
bol.'"" He declared that "as president, . . . I will uphold our precious
right to dissent, but burning the flag goes too far.""'  A columnist
unintentionally caricatured the position of the critics of the Johnson
decision, when in her own bitter attack on the Court she castigated
the tribunal for declaring that freedom of speech was "more impor-
tant than respecting the symbol of freedom.""' 2 Senator Strom Thur-
mond captured the emotional force of much of the criticism of the
Court when he proclaimed to the Senate, "We must stand up for
America. The flag, the flag. America, America. For us!"" 3
The Johnson decision was attacked in popular discussions as
ignoring the wishes of the vast majority and condoning behavior that
would damage the symbolic value of the flag and the strength of the
country. The Indianapolis Star asked in an editorial, "Who will pro-
tect the rights of the millions who oppose destruction of the symbols
of American freedom?" 4 " Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell
said the Johnson decision "devalued and cheapened" 445 the flag, while
an officer of the Seattle chapter of the Veterans of Foreign Wars
declared that "when you destroy that flag, you destroy the principles
of our country."
44 6
Much of the popular criticism of the Johnson decision, especially
in the immediate period after June 21, 1989, was couched in highly
vitriolic terms. Representative Ron Marlenee termed the decision
"treasonous," and in reference to the six Marines depicted in the Iwo
Jima Memorial, declared, "These six brave soldiers were symbolically
438. Richardson, Bush Burns at Court's Flag Edict, Wash. (D.C.) Times, June 23, 1989, at
A6, col. 3.
439. Phillips & Dewar, supra note 431, at A5, col. 1.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Boston Herald, June 23, 1989, at B3, col. I.
443. Ann Arbor (Mich.) News, June 23, 1989, at C2, col. 2.
444. 20 EDITORIALS ON FILE 715 (1989) (reprinting editorial published in the Indianapolis
Star, June 23, 1989).
445. Wash. Post, June 23, 1989, at Al, col. 2.
446. L.A. Times, June 23, 1989, at 1, col. 5.
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shot in the back by five men in black robes.""? The chairman of the
South Carolina Joint Veterans Council called on Americans to write
to their elected officials to demand that "this crap" be stopped." 8
Conservative columnist Pat Buchanan termed the decision an "atroc-
ity" and the Court a "renegade tribunal" to which the American peo-
ple should respond by putting "a fist in their face."" 9 News stories of
public reaction quoted one man as declaring that the "degree of senil-
ity among these judges is greater than most people think."450
Another citizen declared that "they should wrap these five justices up
in a flag and burn them; I wouldn't mind putting a match to it
myself. ' 45 ' The New York Daily News labeled the Johnson decision as
"dumb" and reported that it put the Court in "naked contempt" of
the American people through the justices' display of "pompous insen-
sitivity to the most beloved symbol of the most benevolent form of
government ever to appear on this Earth." ' 2 On the same day, the
Daily News also published a cartoon showing an American soldier,
bearing a resemblance to President Bush, pouring gas on a pile of law
books forming a pyre below five bound judges who were bearing cop-
ies of the "flag case," with the caption "Anybody got a match?"
453
The Dallas Times Herald repeated this theme by illustrating five
judges raising glasses to toast the imminent burning of the Iwo Jima
memorial.454 Newsday published a cartoon showing a dirtied flag
being used as a doormat outside the entrance to the Supreme
Court,4 5 while the New Jersey Record showed Supreme Court justices
roasting marshmallows over a fire fueled by a burning flag.
4 6
With no apparent sense of irony, a number of critics of the John-
son decision called for or exercised the right of symbolic protest in
order to declare that Johnson should have no such right. Thus, some
burned symbolic judges' robes on the steps of the Supreme Court,
while others proposed flying flags upside down or at half-mast.
457
Flag burners, themselves, received even more intense criticism than
447. Isaacson, O'er the Land of the Free, TIME, July 3, 1989, at 14.
448. Columbia (S.C.) State, June 23, 1989, at Al, col. 2.
449. Buchanan, Congress Must Overrule Supreme Court, N.Y. Post, June 23, 1989, at 21,
col. 1.
450. N.Y. Daily News, June 23, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
451. D'Antonio & Firstman, supra note 58, at 4.
452. N.Y. Daily News, supra note 450, at Al, col. 1.
453. Id.
454. Dallas Times-Herald, June 23, 1989, at A16, col. 3.
455. Newsday, July 1, 1989, at 16, col. 4.
456. N.J. Rec., July 4, 1989, at A12, col. 2. /
457. The High Court Stands 5-4 on a Burning Issue, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 3,
1989, at 8; Rogers, supra note 135, at DI, col. 2; D'Antonio & Firstman, supra note 58, at 4;
Richardson, supra note 438, at A4, col. 1; Las Vegas Sun, June 23, 1989, at BI, col. 3.
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did the five majority justices. Many echoed the remarks of Senator
Dole's statement: "[I]f they don't like our flag, they ought to go find
one they do like."' 458 The New York Daily News quoted one "man on
the street" as declaring that if he saw flag burners, "[h]e would smack
them in the head," and another as stating that he would accept the
Court's decision if it "also upholds my right to express myself by beat-
ing the hell out of a flag burner without it being considered a
crime.
45 9
The legal argument for upholding Johnson's conviction did not
differ greatly from the popular argument. In its brief in Johnson,
Texas essentially took the position, supported by two amici briefs,
that the government had a "unique and compelling interest"'46 in
protecting the "physical integrity of the flag so that it may serve as the
paramount symbol of nationhood and unity""' and in preventing the
"dilution of the flag as a symbol. '462 Texas argued that the flag was a
"unique symbol, qualitatively different from any other symbol that
this nation uses to express its existence. ' 463 This uniqueness simply
made protecting its symbolic value override "any First Amendment
rights an individual may have in expressive conduct." 464 "Wanton
destruction in a public context" '465 would endanger the flag's symbolic
value. Texas' position, essentially anchored in the eighty-year-old
466 ~ taHalter decision, reasoned that ordinary legal principles concerning
freedom of expression simply did not apply where the flag was con-
cerned. In fact, both Texas and one of its amicis declared at one point
that the flag was "sui generis. "467
The four dissenting justices adopted this "sui generis" position.
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his dissent by quoting Justice Holmes's
statement that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic," and
then proceeded to demonstrate convincingly that logic had not much
attracted his interest.468 Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that the
458. Wash. Post, supra note 445, at AI, col. 2.
459. N.Y. Daily News, supra note 450, at Al, col. 1.
460. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 24.
461. Id. at 20.
462. Id. at 30.
463. Id. at 26.
464. Id. at 30. See generally Brief of the Legal Affairs Council as Amicus Curiae, Texas v.
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (No. 88-155); Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, supra
note 147.
465. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 24.
466. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
467. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 6, Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (No. 88-155)
[hereinafter Petitioner's Reply Brief]; Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 147,
at 11.
468. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2548 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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"flag is not simply another 'idea' or 'point of view' competing for rec-
ognition in the marketplace of ideas," but a symbol viewed with
"almost mystical reverance" by millions of Americans.469 Justice Ste-
vens, in his dissent, without any attempt to cite legal precedents, pro-
nounced that if "the ideas of liberty and equality . . .are worth
fighting for [then] it cannot be true that the flag that uniquely symbol-
izes their power is not itself worthy of protection and respect. ' 470 He
concluded that "sanctioning the public desecration of the flag will tar-
nish its value."
47'
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent explicitly endorsed the concept
that the views of popular majorities should be controlling with regard
to outlawing behavior which they view as abhorrent. In stating this,
Chief Justice Rehnquist hopelessly blurred the distinction between
political expression and common criminality by declaring, "Surely
one of the high purposes of a democratic society is to legislate against
conduct that is regarded as inherently evil and profoundly offensive to
the majority of people-whether it be murder, embezzlement, pollu-
tion or flag burning. '472 Similarly, Justice Stevens compared John-
son's burning of a flag to spray painting "his message of
dissatisfaction on the facade of the Lincoln Memorial. ' 47 Texas and
its amicis repeatedly analogized the flag, which in fact is primarily an
idea which concretely exists only in millions of often privately-owned
representations, to unique, publicly-owned buildings.
47 4
Texas also argued that forbidding flag desecration placed only a
minor burden on free expression because it "does no more than
prohibit one form of conduct by which a demonstrator may express
himself; there remain abundant alternative avenues of communica-
tion. '475  Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who declared at one
point that flag burning was not an expression at all, but "the
equivalent of a inarticulate grunt or roar," opined that the Texas law
469. Id. at 2552.
470. Id. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
471. Id.
472. Id. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Contrast this narrow view of the Supreme
Court's role and of the principles of constitutional democracy with Justice Jackson in Barnette:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
473. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2557 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
474. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 11.
475. Id.
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left Johnson with "a full panopoly of other symbols and every con-
ceivable form of verbal expression. ' 476 He continued by claiming that
Johnson could have conveyed his message "just as forcefully in a
dozen different ways. ' 477 Justice Stevens added that Johnson had an
"available, alternative form of expression including uttering words
critical of the flag."'4 78 Neither Justice explained, given his analysis of
the unique nature of the flag and the need to protect its symbolic
value, why even verbal criticism of it should be allowed.
Aside from the claimed state interest in protecting the symbolic
value of the flag, Texas advanced a second argument supporting the
notion that compelling state interests overrode any first amendment
considerations: preservation of the peace. 479 Although Texas con-
ceded that no breach of the peace occurred during the Dallas flag
burning, it argued that this was "merely fortuitous" given that the
incident had occurred "at the climax of a turbulent, destructive and
potentially violent demonstration, which had attracted a sizeable
crowd. ' 48° Moreover, the burning followed actual "violations of the
law" for which "charges of criminal mischief... could doubtless have
been brought."48 As was the case with its "symbolic protection"
argument, Texas' argument that flag desecration inherently posed a
considerable threat of provoking a breach of the peace was essentially
based on Halter and subsequent lower court decisions following Hal-
ter. 82 Conceding the lack of such a breach during the flag burning,
Texas stressed that "the purpose of flag desecration statutes... is the
prevention of a breach of the peace as opposed to a punishment for a
breach of the peace." '483 Chief Justice Rehnquist endorsed this argu-
ment, citing Chaplinsky and some of the Vietnam era lower court
decisions. 84
A major weakness in Texas' argument related to the provision of
the Texas law which made the entire crime of "desecration" of a
"venerated" object dependent upon the commission of an act which
the actor "knows will seriously offend" any person witnessing or dis-
covering the action.485 This provision apparently made the Texas law
unconstitutional in light of Supreme Court decisions such as Street,
476. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2556 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
477. Id. at 2555.
478. Id. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
479. Official Transcript, supra note 29, at 5.
480. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 34-35.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 31-36.
483. Id. at 38.
484. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2553 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
485. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(a)(3) (Vernon 1989).
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which had declared that the public expression of ideas could not be
forbidden merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some
of their listeners.486 Texas supported this provision of the statute by
arguing that the law focused on forbidding specific conduct-defac-
ing, damaging, or otherwise physically mistreating the flag-rather
than on the ideas which sought expression.487 Despite the clear lan-
guage of the law, Texas claimed that the law did not fall afoul of Boos
because it was "content neutral," forbidding flag desecration for any
purpose whatsoever.488
This reasoning placed Texas and its amici in a legally untenable
position. Thus, when Justice Scalia asked Dallas Assistant District
Attorney Drew in oral argument before the Supreme Court to suggest
a circumstance in which the flag would be desecrated in order to
"honor" it, she lamely suggested that one could violate the Texas law
by choosing to "burn a flag as an honor for all the individuals who
died in Vietnam. '489 Texas further maintained, despite the clear lan-
guage of the law, that it focused not on whether observers might be
offended by flag desecration, but on the "culpable mental state" of the
actor who had to be engaged in "clear, severe and flagrant acts of
desecration." 49° Thus, Texas argued that "no actual serious offense
need occur in order for the statute to be violated, ' 491 and also that
"relatively casual touching or mishandling of the flag, such as wad-
ding it up and tucking it under a tee shirt" could not be covered even
it if offended people.492 Following this reasoning, the Washington
Legal Foundation, in an amicus brief, argued that the statute was
completely "content neutral. ' 493 The Foundation nonetheless pro-
nounced that the statute could not apply to cases involving burning a
worn flag in order to dispose of it in a dignified manner "because no
one would be offended by such conduct and because burning is the
preferred method of disposing of worn flags."' 494 Such an argument
notably ignored the Gregory Lee Johnsons of this country, who might
be offended by the dignified disposal of a worn flag, but whose opin-
ions were clearly not thought worthy of consideration, much less con-
stitutional protection, by Texas and its amici.
486. See supra notes 374-84 and accompanying text.
487. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 39-41.
488. Id. For a discussion of Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988), see supra notes 41-45
and accompanying text.
489. Official Transcript, supra note 29, at 13.
490. Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note 467, at 11-13.
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 147, at 5.
494. Id.
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
B. The Arguments for Johnson
The arguments made by the Supreme Court majority, Johnson,
and his amici supporting Johnson's constitutional right to burn a flag
as a form of political protest were largely congruent with the public
sentiment represented by a number of newspaper editorialists, civil
libertarians, American Bar Association members, and hundreds of
individual lawyers.495 The proponents' essential argument was that
flag desecration, while distasteful to most Americans, was a form of
political expression and that no existing state interests compelled
overriding the first amendment rights involved. Thus, Justice Bren-
nan, writing for the Court's majority, citing Spence v. Washington496
and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette ,49 declared
that in Johnson, where the flag burning occurred within the context of
a public political demonstration, "the expressive, overtly political
nature of this conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly
apparent"4 9 as an "expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of
this country. '499 Noting that under the Texas law Johnson was prose-
cuted specifically for an expression which he knew would cause "seri-
ous offense," the Court declared that it was "a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment... that the Government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea itself simply because society finds
the idea offensive or disagreeable. ' ' 5°° Thus, while recognizing that
Texas had a legitimate interest in promoting respect for the flag, Jus-
tice Brennan held that this could not provide any constitutional basis
495. A number of editorials from major newspapers either explicitly endorsed the Supreme
Court decision or criticized President Bush and/or Congress for attempting to circumvent it.
See 20 EDITORIALS ON FILE 700-15 (1989). Amici briefs in support of Johnson were fied by
the American and Texas Civil Liberties Unions and by 21 other public interest organizations,
including the National Lawyers Guild, People for the American, the National Organization of
Women, and the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America. The American
Bar Association opposed both legislative and constitutional circumvention of the Johnson
decision at its annual 1989 convention. Biskupic, Scholars Split over Response to Flag-Burning
Ruling, CONG. Q., Sept. 2, 1989, at 225. Additionally, many civil libertarians, legal scholars
and others, including former Solicitors General Charles Fried and Erwin Griswold endorsed
the Johnson decision in hearings before the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Id.; see
also Flag Desecration Legislation, 68 CONG. DIG. 193 (1989). For a complete account of the
congressional hearings on this issue, see Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No.
24 (Washington: GPO 1989) [hereinafter House Hearings]; and Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Ses., Serial No. 5-101-33 (Washington: GPO 1989)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings].
496. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
497. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
498. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2540 (1989).
499. Id. at 2543.
500. Id. at 2544.
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for allowing a state to "foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting
expressive conduct relating to it," 501 and, in particular, to criminally
punish "a person for burning a flag as a means of political protest.
50 2
The Court rejected outright the minority's suggestion that John-
son could have expressed his views in some way other than flag burn-
ing, since constitutionally protected expession "is not dependent, on
the particular mode in which one chooses to express an idea.
'" 50 3
Moreover, the majority pointed out that it was the symbolic power of
the flag itself that enabled Johnson to convey such a forceful message
by burning it, thus refuting Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument that
Johnson could have conveyed his message "just as forcefully by words
or alternative means. '"'  The Court may have based its opinion on
the rationale that banning certain forms of political expression,
merely because other forms were available which the government
found acceptable, would truly open the door to an unlimited eviscera-
tion of American political freedoms. Similarly, the Court rejected the
suggestion of the minority that, due to its unique symbolic importance
and power, "a separate judicial category exists for the American flag
alone. ' 50 5 The Court noted:
To conclude that the Government may permit designated symbols
to be used to communicate only a limited set of messages would be
to enter territory having no discernible or defensible boundaries.
Could the Government, on this theory, prohibit the burning of
state flags ... [or] of the Constitution? In evaluating these choices
under the First Amendment, how would we decide which symbols
were sufficiently special to warrant this unique status?506
The Court also clearly rejected Texas' contention that its flag
desecration law was "content neutral." Justice Brennan noted that by
putting forth a state interest in protecting the flag as a "symbol of
nationhood and national unity," Texas would have the Court endorse
a theory that only symbolic uses of the flag in agreement with that
interpretation of symbolism should be protected.50 7 Moreover, Bren-
nan noted that, "We never before have held that the Government may
ensure that a symbol be used to express only one view of that symbol
or its referents." 50 8
501. Id. at 2545.
502. Id. at 2547.
503. Id. at 2546.
504. Id. at 2546 n. 11.
505. Id. at 2546.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id. (citing Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970)).
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To counter Texas' argument that the possibility of a breach of
the peace without any showing of imminent disturbance could justify
suppression of Johnson's first amendment rights, the majority stated,
"We have not permitted the Government to assume that every expres-
sion of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but have instead required a
careful consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding such
expression. '509 Justice Brennan rejected Chief Justice Rehnquist's
argument that Chaplinsky was a controlling precedent because, in
Johnson, there was no direct personal insult of the "fighting words"
variety likely to provoke an individual to assault Johnson. 510 The
Court also cast doubt upon the sincerity of Texas's alleged interest in
preventing a breach of the peace as justification for prosecuting John-
son. The Court pointed out that the state had demonstrated that
actual, rather than hypothetical, "disorderly actions" occurred during
the period of the demonstration that preceeded Johnson's flag burn-
ing, yet "no charges were brought on the basis of this conduct." ''
The majority rejected the notion that flag burning would in fact
damage the symbolic value of the flag, a contention for which Texas
never presented a shred of evidence, and asserted that "conduct such
as Johnson's will not endanger the special role played by our flag or
the feelings it inspires." 5 1 2 The Court asserted the hypothesis, which
would come to fruition in the post-Johnson uproar, that "one gesture
of an unknown man [would not].change our Nation's attitude towards
its flag. ' ' 513 Finally, the Court clearly drew a distinction between sub-
stance and symbol-between the fundamental and real values of polit-
ical freedoms involved in protecting Johnson's first amendment rights
as opposed to protecting only a symbol of such freedoms. Justice
Brennan declared that the "flag's deservedly cherished place in our
community [would be bolstered by] a reaffirmation of the principles of
freedom and inclusiveness [that it] best reflects. '51 4 He concluded
that "[w]e do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for
in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem
represents."
515
Virtually all of the major points made in Brennan's decision were
also noted in the briefs filed on Johnson's behalf and in the commen-
tary of supporters of the decision. The most common arguments sup-
509. Id. at 2542.
510. Id.
511. Id. at 2541.
512. Id. at 2547.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id. at 2547-48.
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porting the Court's decision focused on the fundamental democratic
principles at stake and the Court's valuation of this substantive con-
cern over the protection of a symbol of those principles. A letter to
the editor of the New York Daily News (one of the most bitter critics
of the decision) declared that suppression of dissent would "render
meaningless the symbol we think we are protecting. The true beauty
of our flag lies not in the materials it is woven from but in the mean-
ing behind it."'5 16 Similarly, the Los Angeles Times made this same
point with a cartoon showing President Bush burning the Bill of
Rights, while declaring, "Burning the flag goes too far."' 517 The Salt
Lake Tribune depicted Bush as a Founding Father changing a draft of
the first amendment to exempt from its protections "flag burning or
anything else that is unpopular and makes a lot of voters
unhappy."51 An Atlanta Constitution cartoon suggested the lack of
any real physical or symbolic threat to the flag by showing President
Bush, as a fireman on a huge flag-bedecked, speeding fire engine
labeled "constitutional amendment," explaining to a pedestrian, "We
got a report of a flag on fire!! ' " 9 Justice Brennan's "slippery slope"
argument that a "flag exception" to the Constitution would open the
way for other exceptions was the subject of an hilarious column by
Mike Royko.520 Royko asked why nothing was done to protect the
dignity of the national anthem, which he declared was by far more
frequently scorned by inattention and improper behavior at athletic
events than the flag was threatened by burnings.52 1 After describing a
litany of such sins, Royko proposed a corrective constitutional
amendment to make it a crime "during the singing of the national
anthem in any public place [to] drink any beverage, chew gum, talk,
whisper, scratch, yawn, pick your nose, gawk, leer or slouch [or to]
fail to sing," with mutes "required to sing in sign language.
'522
V. IN THE AFTERMATH OF JOHNSON
A. Constitutional Amendment Versus Overriding Legislation
As previously discussed, the immediate reaction to the Johnson
decision, from the public as well as from President Bush and Con-
516. Letter from T. Bronson to the Editor of the New York Daily News (July 9, 1989),
reprinted in N.Y. Daily News, July 9, 1989, at A12, col. 4.
517. Hertzberg, The Flag Is Fireproof, L.A. Times, June 29, 1989, at II: 7, col. 1.
518. Salt Lake Tribune, July 5, 1989, at A3, col. 1.
519. Atlanta Constitution, July 6, 1989, at B13, col. 2.
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gress, was overwhelmingly negative. Five hundred and eight con-
gresssmen voted resolutions of disapproval of the decision within a
week of its delivery, with only eight members in both houses voting
against the resolutions. 23 Although the initial public uproar died
down considerably after about a month, the only substantive debate in
Washington quickly became centered upon whether it would be possi-
ble to circumvent Johnson by law, a position favored by most 'Demo-
crats, or whether a constitutional amendment would be required, a
position taken by President Bush and most Republicans. Even mem-
bers of Congress who believed neither alternative was desirable felt
compelled for political reasons to support one of these approaches.
Thus, when former Solicitor General Charles Fried told a House
Judiciary subcommittee that the Court's decision was correct and that
Congress should take no action to override it, Subcomittee Chairman
Don Edwards said, "Your point of view is the correct point of view,
but it's such a [political] loser. ' 524 Congresswoman Pat Schroeder
agreed, stating, "We're not talking about a purist world. We're talk-
ing about a very political world.
'525
Those who opposed both a consitutional amendment and a law
essentially repeated the above summarized arguments made in sup-
port of the Johnson decision. There were, however, three additional
arguments once the amendment-law debate began. The first was that
the whole issue had become one of political pandering more than any-
thing else. President Bush was especially criticized for allegedly try-
ing to repeat his 1988 presidential campaign strategy. Thus, a Salt
Lake Tribune cartoon depicted Bush as an emperor, naked except for
the flag,526 while the Washington Post showed a flag reading "politics
first" hoisted over the American flag atop the White House. 527 Others
criticized politicians of both parties. Radio personality and author
Garrison Keillor suggested that "[a]ny decent law to protect the flag
ought to prohibit politicians from wrapping it around themselves, 5 28
while the Philadelpia Inquirer published a cartoon showing a Republi-
can elephant and a Democratic donkey tearing a flag to shreds in a
tug-of-war.
529
A second criticism of the Flag Flap was that, given the lack of
any real flag burning threat to the country, the whole issue was an
523. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
524. Wash. Post, July 20, 1989, at A17, col. 1.
525. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1989, at A8, col. 4.
526. Salt Lake Tribune, July 2, 1989, at A3, col 1.
527. Wash. Post, June 30, 1989, at A22, col. 4.
528. Keillor, Toasting the Flag, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1989, at E13, col. 3.
529. Philadelphia Inquirer, July 2, 1989, at B6, col. 3.
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absurd distraction to solving the country's real problems. Represen-
tative Walter Fauntroy termed the entire controversy "another exam-
ple of misplaced priorities of too many of our national leaders and our
people" since issues such as "affordable housing, adequate health
care, education and the anti-drug effort [were] far more critical to the
quality of life of the American people. '5 30 A New York Daily News
cartoon illustrated this point by depicting politicians scrambling to
get under a "flag amendment" tent to avoid a rainy downpour of
"issues. 5 31 Similarly, the New Jersey Record portrayed a flag-covered
bandwagon crowded with politicians and led by President Bush, with
an attached sign reading "Free ride for all politicians!! Tired of con-
troversial issues? Hop aboard! No Risk!! Photo-ops galore!!
'5 32
A third criticism of the drive to circumvent the Court was that
there would be no way satisfactorily to define such terms as "flag"
and "desecrate" in either legislation or a constitutional amendment.
For example, a Washington Post cartoon showed a man rushing to
stop his wife from burning the trash, since an envelope in the waste-
basket had "an American flag [stamp] on it."'533 A columnist in the
Wall Street Journal reported coming across an American flag
depicted in a flower bed in New York's City Hall Park and wondering
if it would be legal to "[s]pray-pesticide the flag?" '53 4 The columnist
pondered whether "an organically grown flag" would be approved,
but a chemically-grown flag would be "a constitutional no-no." 535 He
also questioned whether not having a flower bed flag blooming by
Flag Day would lead to charges of "disloyalty," and what would hap-
pen if an inept gardener "allow[ed] slugs to eat holes in the flag?"
5 36
A satirical column in the Washington Post suggested that "desecra-
tion" be defined to mean "subjecting the flag to damage, disrepect or
funny business," and that anyone who, with regard to a flag, "mis-
folds, improperly launders, shreds, deep-fat-fries . . . sneezes at,
whips-chops-and-purees, wears a hat in the whereabouts of ... [or]
fails to get kinda misty at [would be subject to] two years imprison-
ment ... making license plates emblazoned with the motto 'Land of
the Free, Home of the Symbolically Obedient.' -37 The column also
proposed the establishment of a commission on "'Symbolico-Devo-
530. Should Congress Pass Laws to Protect Flag and Gains of Blacks?, JET, July 17, 1989, at
7.
531. N.Y. Daily News, Aug. 8, 1989, at B3, col. 2.
532. N.J. Record, July 12, 1989, at A12, col. 4.
533. Wash. Post, Oct. 15, 1989, at B6, col. 3.
534. Hagen, Flag Flap Takes Root in the Garden, Wall St. J., July 24, 1989, at A12, col. 1.
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Suplee, Flag Follies, Wash. Post, July 23, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
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tional Malfeasance,' [to] advise the states and the federal government,
on properly reverent behavior towards the Flag and Related Textile
Entities."538
While those who argued that nothing should be done about the
Johnson decision no doubt offered an astute analysis, the real debate
occurred between proponents of an amendment versus proponents of
a law. The Democratic congressional leadership, most congressional
Democrats, and a scattering of others (including Harvard Law Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe), all of whom favored a law, noted that the
Johnson decision struck down a Texas statute that forebade flag dese-
cration likely to cause "serious offense" to observers. 539 As the Court
noted, the Texas law was not aimed at "protecting the physical integ-
rity of the flag in all circumstances." 5" Moreover, proponents of the
statute explained that the Court had never explicity ruled on such a
law. They argued that five members of the Supreme Court might
uphold a "content neutral" law forbidding flag desecration under all
circumstances, without reference to any "offensive" impact upon
observers or any behavior casting "contempt" upon the flag, as was
the case with the 1968 federal law and many of the state flag desecra-
tion laws.541  The majority of the House Judiciary Committee
endorsed the "monuments" theory as a justification for such a "con-
tent neutral" law, arguing that its proposed bill "reflects the govern-
ment's power to honor [the] diverse and deeply held feelings of the
vast majority of citizens for the flag [through the] protection of a ven-
erated object in the same manner that protection is afforded to
gravesites or historic buildings." '542
Because such a law would effectively ban flag burning, and, if
upheld, overturn Johnson, its proponents argued that its passage
would be quicker than a constitutional amendment and would avoid
"tinkering" with the Constitution, thereby allegedly circumventing
any "slippery slope" of additional constitutional infringements on first
amendment freedoms. 543 Of course, since proponents of a statute
openly proclaimed that its advantage would be to hasten the same
effect as a constitutional amendment, it is difficult to see how their
538. Id.
539. Senate Hearings, supra note 495, at 140.
540. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2543 (1989).
541. See supra notes 163-65 & 257 and accompanying text. For the arguments favoring a
statute, see sources cited supra note 495; and infra notes 543-44.
542. H.R. Rep. No. 231, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1989) [hereinafter H.R. REP.].
543. For examples of the argument against "tinkering" with the Bill of Rights, see S. REP.
No. 162, 101st Cong., 1st sess. 4-9 (1989) [hereinafter S. REP.], and various statements printed
in House Hearings, supra note 495.
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"slope" would be any less "slippery." In fact, such action could open
up a precedential path for quickly and easily evading Supreme Court
decisions upholding unpopular constitutional rights by legislative sub-
terfuge. Many of the proponents of a statute also suggested that they
would back a constitutional amendment if the statutory approach
failed in the Supreme Court,5" suggesting that only tactics, and not
fundamental democratic principles, were really at issue. Their funda-
mental point was, as the Senate Judiciary Committee majority put it,
that "the amendment process should be invoked as a last-not as a
first-resort. 5 45  In contrast, many Democrats gave the general
impression that they actually accepted the Johnson decision as consti-
tutionally proper, but regarded the effects of supporting its outcome
as political suicide. 
54
The political strategy of the statute's proponents was to hope
that public and political pressure would cause at least one Justice
from the Johnson majority to uphold a "content neutral" law. These
supporters noted that Justice Blackmun, who voted with the majority
in Johnson, had suggested in Smith v. Goguen 547 fifteen years earlier
that he supported the constitutionality of a law that provided general
protection for the flag's physical integrity. 548 The Senate Judiciary
Committee openly announced this strategy, not only by pointing to
Justice Blackmun's Goguen dissent, 549 but also by quoting in its report
the following written testimony of Columbia Law School Professor
Henry Monaghan:
Texas Y. Johnson is far too unstable a precedent to permit a confi-
dent conclusion that a majority of the Court would reach [the]
result [of striking down all flag desecration statutes]. Johnson itself
was 5-4, and the minority seems adamant. Thus, the fundamental
question is whether the proposed legislation is sufficiently different
to detach one or more members of the majority. As a predictive
matter, that seems to me a fair possibility ...."o
Similarly, two other law professors were quoted as predicting
that at least one of the Justices in the Johnson 5-to-4 majority would
validate a statute which was "content-neutral, at least on its face," by
544. For statements by backers of a statute that if necessary they would seriously consider
or support a constitutional amendment, see House Hearings, supra note 495, at 31 (statement
of Sen. Arlen Specter); and Wash. Post, July 28, 1989, at A6, col. 6 (quoting Rep. Jack Brooks,
Chairman, House Judiciary Committee).
545. S. REP., supra note 543, at 4.
546. See supra notes 429-37 and accompanying text.
547. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
548. Id. at 591 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
549. S. REP., supra note 543, at 13.
550. Id. at 15.
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distinguishing it from the Texas law. 551 Senator Arlen Specter, while
denying any intent to "intimidate" the Court into "changing its inter-
pretation of the First Amendment" even noted two historical exam-
ples where public discontent had apparently led Justices to change
their orientation: the 1930's "court packing" controversy and the late
1950's "subversion" controversy.552
Proponents of a constitutional amendment argued that no bill
which sought to outlaw flag desecration could stand Supreme Court
scrutiny under the principles established in Johnson, a position which
the Supreme Court shortly thereafter validated in United States v.
Eichman.553 The only result of passing an inevitably constitutionally
defective statute, amendment backers argued, would be to generate
litigation which, after a long delay, would result in the new law being
struck down, followed by a return to the alternative of seeking a con-
stitutional amendment. 5 4 In the words of Judge Robert Bork, "After
several years we would be right where we are now."'15 5 Proponents of
the constitutional amendment approach added that since the flag was
"unique," there could be no "slippery slope. ' 556  Moreover, they
asserted that attempting to circumvent a Supreme Court decision by
legislation would create its own "slippery slope" of bad precedent. 557
Eight dissenting members of the House Judiciary Committee revealed
much about the mentality of the amendment's proponents when they
asked, "Why are we so reluctant to amend the Constitution to
demand that flag desecration be prohibited? Is it too much to ask that
those who call themselves Americans be required to have respect for
551. Id.
552. Id. at 30.
553. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990). This position was stated most clearly by Assistant Attorney
General William P. Barr, who described the Johnson holding to the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights as follows:
[W]henever someone burns the Flag for expressive purposes, that conduct is
protected by the First Amendment; that to prohibit such conduct, the
Government must have a compelling reason that is unrelated to expression; that
the Government's reason for protecting the flag (to preserve it as a symbol of
national unity) is inherently and necessarily related to expression; and that the
Government's interest in protecting the flag as a symbol of our national unity can
never be sufficienty compelling to overcome an individual's First Amendment
interest in burning the Flag for communicative purposes. This reasoning plainly
would extend to any Flag desecration statute enacted to protect the Flag as a
symbol of our Nation.
House Hearings, supra note 495, at 174.
554. See House Hearings, supra note 495, at 32-37; see also H.R. REP., supra note 542, at
15-26.
555. 68 CONG. DIG. 218 (1989).
556. H.R. REP., supra note 542, at 22.
557. Id.
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the flag?"55 I
B. An Analysis of the Flag Protection Act of 1989
Amidst the hysterical reaction during the period following the
Johnson decision, " 9 it was widely predicted that a constitutional
amendment to outlaw flag desecration would quickly pass both
Houses of Congress and be ratified by the states in record time. The
day after Johnson was decided, American University Law Professor
Herman Schwartz assessed the chances of a constitutional amend-
ment as "pretty good" because allowing flag burning would be "like
prohibiting Americans from eating apple pie." 6° A week later, New
Republic columnist Hendrik Hertzberg decried President Bush's pro-
posed amendment as "just another tactic for narrow partisan gain,"
but lamented that "it's hard to see at this point who's going to stop
him." 5 6' Duke University Law Professor Walter Dellinger predicted
that "any amendent that comes out of the Congress will be ratified
faster than any amendment on record. ' 562 Kansas State Senate Presi-
dent Paul Burke declared that a constitutional amendment to ban flag
burning "would blow through the House or Senate like a thunder-
storm through Kansas.
'563
Despite the initial surge of support for a constitutional amend-
ment, by late July press reports suggested a considerable lessening of
public interest in the entire issue, coupled with increasing public
acceptance of the argument that the Constitution should not be hast-
ily "tinkered" with if other alternatives were available.5 6 Thus, Kan-
sas Senator Nancy Kassebaum reported that while she had been
deluged with petitions demanding an amendment in late June, by late
July, sixty percent of her mail on the issue opposed such action.
65
Representative Ben Jones reported a similar shift in feelings among
his Georgia constituents, noting that the "issue has cooled and people
are more thoughtful" and "more reflective about whether they want
to alter the constitution in response to this kind of stupidity. ' 566 A
poll published in mid-July, reflective of this shift in opinion, indicated
that fifty-one percent of a cross-section of Americans preferred a law
558. Id. (emphasis added).
559. See supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
560. Wash. Times, June 23, 1989, at AI, col. 1.
561. Hertzberg, supra note 518, at II: 7, col. 3.
562. Wash. Post, July 1, 1989, at A4, col. 1.
563. Legislators Supporting Flag Move, supra note 66, at A6, col. 2.
564. Hentoff, Whatever Happened to the Flag Fire, Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 1989, at A17, col. 1.
565. Dewar & Kenworthy, supra note 74, at Al, col. 1.
566. Id.
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to overturn the-decision, while only thirty-one percent of that same
group supported an amendment.567 Several congressmen reported
that by mid-summer their mail and personal conversations with con-
stituents revealed relatively little interest in the entire issue. 568 For
example, Senator Bob Kerrey, a Vietnam veteran and Congressional
Medal of Honor winner, reported that although polls in his state in
August showed sixty-three percent support for an amendment, he had
heard "almost nothing" from his constituents about his own public
opposition to either a law or a constitutional amendment. 569 Kerrey
concluded that "[iut looks like a hot political issue, but it isn't."57
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Joseph Biden, the chief spon-
sor of the legislative approach, declared that due to political fear, con-
gressmen "got out ahead of the people" and that "even among the
veteran's groups, there's not any real enthusiasism" for an
amendment. 571
Perhaps due to a cooling of public sentiment, to the "elite's"
growing opposition to a constitutional amendment as evidenced by a
public letter to that effect signed by over 500 law professors, 572 or to
the growing public preference for a statute rather than constitutional
"tinkering," the drive for a constitutional amendment, which had
seemed unstoppable in late June 1989, was clearly sputtering by Octo-
ber 1989. During the Senate vote on October 19 which killed the
amendment by a 51-to-48 vote (with a two-thirds vote required for
approval), four Republicans, who had originally co-sponsored the
proposed amendment, voted against it.573 Included in this foursome
was Senator John Danforth, who publicly declared that he had earlier
made a "mistake of the heart" since the "great thing" about the
United States was that "our constitution protects any crackpot who
wants to stand on his soapbox and express any oddball point of
view."
'574
Although the October 19 vote killed, at least temporarily, the
movement in support of the passage of a constitutional amendment
which would essentially overturn Johnson, both houses had passed the
567. Id.
568. Id.; see also Toner, 'Star' Girds at Homefor Senate War, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1989, at
11, col. 1; Toner, Back in Grass Roots, Congessman Is All Ears, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1989, at 1,
col. 4.
569. Dewar & Kenworthy, supra note 74, at Al, col. 2.
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. 137 CONG. REC. S13647 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1989) (letters from law professors).
573. Wash. Post, Oct. 18, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
574. Wash. Post, Oct. 20, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
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Flag Protection Act of 1989 during the interim.57 This law provided
for penalties of up to one year in jail and a $1000 fine for anyone who
"knowingly mutilates, physically defiles, bums, maintains on the floor
or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States" with
"flag" defined as "any flag of the United States, or any part thereof,
made of any substance, of any size, in a form that is commonly dis-
played. ' ' -7 6 Specifically exempted from the statute was "any conduct
consisting of the disposal of a flag when it has become worn or
soiled."577 The law mandated expedited judicial review by way of a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a federal district court's final
judgment.578 The law declared that upon such an appeal, the
Supreme Court "shall, if it has not previously ruled on the question,
accept jurisdiction over the appeal and advance on the docket and
expedite to the greatest extent possible." '57 9
The Flag Desecration Act of 1989 was one of the most hypocriti-
cal, illogical, poorly drafted, and blatantly unconstitutional laws
which Congress has ever passed-and the Supreme Court struck it
down in record time in the United States v. Eichman decision.5 80 As
the Arkansas Gazette noted on October 8, 1989, the bill's only virtues
"are negative ones-it's not as bad as [permanently disfiguring the
Constitution with] an amendment, and it might lessen support for an
amendment. 5 8 1 The Chicago Tribune noted on October 15, 1989,
that the vast majority of congressmen "hope passage of a law will
provide them with political cover while heading off" such an amend-
ment.582 These negative virtues, however, were not enough to uphold
the propriety of the law, morally, legally, or linguistically.
The fundamental legal justification of the Flag Desecration Act
stemmed from an interpretation of the Supreme Court's analysis of
the Texas statute at issue in Johnson. In its analysis, the Court specifi-
cally noted that the statute was "not aimed at protecting the physical
integrity of the flag in all circumstances, 5 83 but rather was designed
to protect the flag "from intentional and knowing abuse that causes
575. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
576. See Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, § 2(a)(1), 103 Stat. 777
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 700).
577. Id. § 2(a)(2).
578. Id. § 2(d)(2).
579. Id.
580. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
581. 20 EDITORIALS ON FILE 1197 (1989) (reprinting editorial published in Arkansas
Gazette, Oct. 8, 1989).
582. Id. at 1200 (reprinting editorial published in Chicago Tribune, Oct. 15, 1989).
583. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2536 (1989).
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serious offense to others." '584 Johnson's conviction "depended on the
likely communicative impact of his expressive conduct" and "the con-
tent of the message he conveyed." 8 5 The wording of the Flag
Desecretion Act was based on these fragments from the Johnson deci-
sion and the possibility that Justice Blackmun might abandon his
position and join the Johnson minority in upholding the constitution-
ality of a supposedly "content neutral" statute." 6 Thus, the Senate
Judiciary Committee report supporting the Act maintained that the
Act focuses "solely and exclusively on the conduct [as opposed to any
intended message] of the actor"58 7 and protects the "physical integrity
of the flag in all circumstances." ' This was proclaimed consistent
with the Congress's alleged right to "protect symbols and land-
marks," especially the "unique and unalloyed symbol of the nation,"
in recognition of the "diverse and powerfully held feelings of our citi-
zens for the flag."58 9 The Committee declared that "[w]hen it comes
to the American flag-that one symbol of the spirit of our democ-
racy-we care more about protecting its physical integrity than about
determining why its integrity has been threatened. 5 90 The Commit-
tee also claimed, somewhat anomalously, that protecting the flag's
physical integrity because "of what it expresses and represents" poses
no first amendment problems because such protection was not
designed to "censor or suppress the person who might attack it."
591
The Committee's analysis contained several fundamental
problems. First, the claim that the Flag Protection Act's objective
was simply to protect the flag's physical integrity rather than to sup-
press dissent is an obvious and blatant distortion. After all, the entire
uproar over the Johnson decision was in reaction to Johnson's burning
of the flag as a form of political protest.592 Moreover, rather than
being "content neutral," the Act pointedly prohibited symbolic uses
of flags which have traditionally been used for protest purposes,
including placing a flag on the floor, even though these uses do not
threaten the flag's physical integrity, while it allowed all symbolic
uses which traditionally have been used for patriotic purposes, includ-
ing carrying flags into battle, even if they threaten the flag's physical
integrity. Further, as Senators Hatch and Grassley, who supported a
584. Id.
585. Id. at 2543.
586. See supra notes 548-52 and accompanying text.
587. S. REP., supra note 543, at 4.
588. Id.
589. Id. at 3, 4.
590. Id. at 5.
591. Id.
592. See id. at 6-9.
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constitutional amendment, 593 commented in their dissent to the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee's report:
[I]t simply cannot be denied that the principal if not the only pur-
pose in enacting a facially neutral statute is to prohibit expressive
conduct that physically desecrates the flag. No one claims that we
are interested in protecting the material, the thread and the dye in
the flag. We protect the flag as a symbol, including against those
who would desecrate the flag as part of political expression.
5 94
Second, the explicit exception made for the desecration of "worn
and soiled" flags595 completely undercuts the claim of the Act's sup-
porters that it would impartially protect the flag from desecration,
regardless of motive.5 96 As the House Judiciary Committee noted,
597
this exception was added because burning has been the traditional and
preferred method of disposing of worn flags under the United States
flag code.598 The House Committee ineffectively justified this excep-
tion to its purportedly "content neutral" law which, in fact, legalized
burning a flag for good motives, but outlawed burning one for bad
motives, by asserting that it was not an exception at all since a worn
flag "is no longer a fitting emblem for display."'599 Thus, governmen-
tal interests in protecting a worn flag's physical integrity would no
longer apply. Further, without this exception, the Committee
claimed the new law would "require the maintenance of all flags in
perpetuity."'
In fact, the Committee's reasoning demonstrates that the govern-
mental interest is not in the physical integrity of the cloth of the flag
at all, but rather in the flag's symbolic value. This symbolic value can
be damaged only by speech or other expression because, as an abstract
idea, the flag cannot be damaged by the physical destruction of any
one emblem. Unlike the uniqueness of the Lincoln Memorial or the
original copy of the Constitution, both of which have inherent mone-
tary or historic value, the flag exists only in the form of symbolistic
replicas. Thus, its value cannot, in practical terms, be physically
593. Id. at 26. Senators Hatch and Grassley believe that a "constitutional amendment is
the safest, surest, and most permanent way of achieving the protection of the flag." Id.
594. Id. at 24.
595. See Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, § 2(a)(2), 103 Stat. 777
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 700). Under the Act, "any conduct consisting of the disposal of a flag
when it has become worn or soiled" is permitted. Id.
596. See S. REP., supra note 543, at 3-5.
597. H.R. REP., supra note 542, at 10.
598. See 36 U.S.C. § 176(k) (1988) which states: "The flag, when it is in such condition
that it is no longer a fitting emblem for display, should be destroyed in a dignified way,
preferably by burning."
599. H.R. REP., supra note 542, at 9.
600. Id. at 10.
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damaged, but only symbolically damaged, and then merely by the
expression of ideas which are protected by the first amendment.
Moreover, the Act's supporters misread Johnson by focusing on
references to the Texas law's serious offense provision. Instead, they
should have focused on the heart of the Court's decision that Johnson
had burned the flag as an "expressive, overtly political" act, and that
Texas' professed interest in "preserving the flag as a symbol of
nationhood and national unity" was "related to expression" and
emerged "only when a person's treatment of the flag communicate[d]
some message." 601 Recognizing that the "bedrock principle underly-
ing the First Amendment is ... that the Government may not pro-
hibit the expression of an idea because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable,"'6 2 the Court specifically held that the gov-
ernment may not "foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting
expressive conduct relating to it"' 3 or by permitting "designated
symbols to be used to communicate only a limited set of messages."'
In particular, the government may not achieve this end by seeking
criminally to punish a person for burning the flag as a means of polit-
ical protest.6" Further, the Court anticipated passage of a statute
such as the Flag Protection Act, and opined that a law outlawing flag
burnings in general while exempting the ceremonial burning of worn
flags would not be content neutral or pass constitutional muster.606 It
stated:
Texas's focus on the precise nature of Johnson's expression, more-
over, misses the point of our prior decisions: their enduring lesson,
that the government may not prohibit expression simply because it
disagrees with its message, is not dependent on the particular mode
in which one chooses to express an idea. If we were to hold that a
State may forbid flag-burning where it is likely to endanger the
flag's symbolic role, but allow it wherever burning a flag promotes
that role-as where, for example, a person ceremoniously bums a
dirty flag-we would be saying that when it comes to impairing the
flag's physical integrity, the flag itself may be used as a symbol...
only in one direction .... We would be permitting a state to [legis-
late] ... that one may burn the flag to convey one's attitude toward
601. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2540-42 (1989). Indeed, in his June 30, 1989,
speech at the Iwo Jima memorial urging support for a constitutional amendment, President
Bush termed the flag "one of our most powerful ideas." Remarks of President George Bush,
supra note 118, at 1.
602. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2544.
603. Id. at 2545.
604. Id. at 2536.
605. Id. at 2544; cf Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 580 (1969) (holding that a state may
not criminally punish persons for making derogatory comments about the flag).
606. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2546.
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it and its referents only if one does not endanger the flag's repre-
sentation of nationhood and national unity.6°7
In light of Johnson and the Court's earlier decisions regarding
content neutral legislation, 6°8 a content neutral statute would not be
one banning all physical desecrations of the flag regardless of motive,
but one forbidding all symbolic uses of the flag, including flying it,
waving it, or burning it. The Congress should have known, however,
that even then the law would be unconstitutional under Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,'0 9 where the Court declared
that "[t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation
extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to
the prohibition of public dicussions of an entire topic. '61° In short,
although the analysis of those favoring a constitutional amendment to
overrule Johnson reflects an inadequate understanding of the meaning
of freedom of speech in a democratic society, the proponents were
correct in deducing that a constitutional amendment would be the
only way to overturn Johnson.61  The constitutional amendment pro-
ponents were also correct in pointing to the hypocrisy of the statute's
proponents who maintained they did not want to "tinker" with the
Bill of Rights. As Senators Hatch and Grassley remarked, "How is a
statute which prohibits flag desecration in all or some instances not a
threat to First Amendment principles, while a constitutional amend-
ment achieving the same thing is such a threat?
612
Other provisions of the the Flag Protection Act rendered it con-
stitutionally suspect as well. The Act's terms and definitions were
hopelessly vague and confusing. Undoubtedly, the terms "mutilate,"
"deface," and "physically defile ' 3 would have led to the same
morass of endless and inconsistent litigation characteristic of flag
burning cases of the Vietnam era.614 Further, because it made no dis-
tinction between public and private actions, one could violate the Act
607. Id.
608. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970). For a
discussion of these cases in connection with content neutrality, see supra notes 408-18 and
accompanying text.
609. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
610. Id. at 536.
611. See S. REP., supro note 543, at 24, 26. Senators Hatch and Grassley concluded that "a
constitutional amendment is absolutely necessary to ensure with certainty the validity of any
statute banning flag desecration .... [I]t is futile to try to overturn [the Johnson Court's]
interpretation by a statute." Id. at 24, 29.
612. Id. at 26.
613. See Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, § 2(a)(1), 103 Stat. 777
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 700).
614. See supra notes 289-351 and accompanying text.
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simply by thumbtacking a flag to a wall in one's home. While thus
broadly outlawing potentially expressive and non-expressive conduct,
the Act at the sime time provided an absolute defense for additional
damage inflicted upon worn or soiled flags for any reason whatso-
ever.6" 5 As ten dissenting members of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee declared, a "'dirty flag defense' is an absolute defense for any
protestor who feels the need to torch 'Old Glory.' ""6 In opposition
to both a law and an amendment, Senator Metzenbaum declared that,
under the terms of the Act, cases will likely turn "upon the amor-
phous concept of whether a flag was sufficiently tattered to have war-
ranted disposal."6" 7 Such an issue would be virtually unresolvable;
first, because the law defines neither "worn" nor "soiled," and second,
because once a flag is disposed of, so is the evidence, in the absence of
any photographs that definitively establish the flag's prior condition.
The most insidious aspect of the Act is- that it fails clearly to
define what constitutes a flag, defining it as "any flag of the United
States, or any part thereof made of any substance, of any size, in a
form that is commonly displayed."618 This definition begs the ques-
tion as to what constitutes "any part" of a flag or "common display."
Would anything with red and white stripes or a white star on a blue
field be a flag for purposes of the statute? Would a tee-shirt with a
flag printed on it constitute a "commonly displayed" form? The
House Committee on the Judiciary suggested that the law would not
include "photographs of flags, products with flags printed on them,
decorative representations of flags [such as] flag designs on clothing, a
cake in the shape of a flag," or flags on such items as napkins, paper
plates, or socks which "are not actual flags in that they are not com-
monly displayed as flags and have other uses. ' 619 But none of this
legislative gloss was reflected in the language of the Act itself, which
refers to flags "made of any substance, of any size. '620 In addition,
because the alleged government interest pertains to preserving the
flag's "physical integrity" as the "symbol of the spirit of our democ-
racy," it is illogical to exclude damaging a representation of the flag
on a tee-shirt or defacing a large photograph or billboard of the flag.
In any case, the underlying question is whether the government has
615. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. 1. No. 101-131, § 2(a)(2), 103 Stat. 777 (amending
18 U.S.C. § 700).
616. H.R. REP., supra note 542, at 22.
617. S. REP., supra note 543, at 20.
618. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, § 2(b), 103 Stat. 777 (amending 18
U.S.C. § 700).
619. H.R. REP., supra note 542, at 11.
620. See supra text accompanying note 618.
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any legitimate interest in regulating the use its citizens make of
objects that symbolize "the spirit of our democracy." '621
C. The Flag Protection Act in the District Courts
The Flag Protection Act took effect at midnight on October 28,
1989. Just minutes after midnight, protesters burned a flag in Seattle,
Washington, during a political demonstration in front of the post
office; two days later, protesters burned flags under similar circum-
stances on the steps of the capitol in Washington, D.C.62 2 Altogether,
seven people were prosecuted for the flag burnings and two federal
court cases resulted: United States v. Haggerty623 and United States v.
Eichman.624 Early in 1990, the federal district courts ruled in both
cases that, under the principles of Johnson, the Flag Protection Act of
1989 was unconstitutional as applied to political protesters who dese-
crated the flag. 6 25 Both courts essentially accepted the defense posi-
tion that the Johnson case was controlling because the defendants
were engaged in expressive conduct requiring first amendment scru-
tiny, and because the underlying government interest of protecting the
symbolic value of the flag provided no overriding compelling
concern.
626
Three different government briefs filed in both cases-one each
from the Justice Department, the Senate, and the House of Represent-
atives-all argued that the Flag Protection Act was "distinguishable
from the law reviewed in Johnson," but reached such a conclusion
"by differing and even conflicting means.) 627 Since all three briefs
ultimately agreed, however, that the "underlying purpose" of the new
law was to preserve the flag's symbolic value, the statute was deter-
mined to be "content-based and subject to strict scrutiny. ' 62 In so
holding, the district court in each case rejected House and Senate
arguments for application of the more lenient United States v.
O'Brien 629 test because neither court believed that the Flag Protection
621. S. REP., supra note 543, at 5.
622. See A Thousand Points of Light: Flag Desecration Protests Spread in Opposition to Law,
Emergency Comm. to Stop Flag Amend. & L., Newsl. No. 5, at 2, col. 1 (Dec. 1989) (on file
with author).
623. 731 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Wash. 1990), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Eichman, 110 S.
Ct. 2404 (1990).
624. 731 F. Supp. 1123 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
625. See id. at 1131; Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. at 421-22.
626. See Eichman, 731 F. Supp. at 1128-31; Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. at 418-22.
627. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. at 417.
628. Eichman, 731 F. Supp. at 1128.
629. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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Act could be justified on non-speech regulation grounds. 630 Further,
as the Haggerty court noted, the law simply was not content neutral
because it singled out for prohibition conduct "associated with disre-
spect for the flag," but allowed conduct that threatened the flag's
physical integrity if it did not "communicate a negative or disrespect-
ful message. ' ' 63 1 At the same time, the district courts rejected the Jus-
tice Department's stance maintaining that the government's interest
was "sufficiently compelling to survive strict scrutiny," despite the
Supreme Court's rejection of this position in Johnson.632 The Justice
Department argued that since the Johnson decision, "both the Con-
gress and the Executive have pronounced the protection of the flag as
a necessary policy goal" and their actions demonstrate the "compel-
ling nature of the government's interest. ' 633 Both courts, in holding
the Flag Protection Act unconstitutional, were equally eloquent in
defending first amendment rights. The Eichman. court stated that
"[h]owever compelling the government may see its interests, they can-
not justify restrictions on speech which shake the very cornerstone of
630. See Eichman, 731 F. Supp. at 1128-29; Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. at 417-18. The
Haggerty court noted that by so "strenuously" arguing this point, Congress implicitly
conceded that "[t]he Act cannot survive the more stringent standards applied in Johnson." Id.
at 421. For a discussion of the O'Brien balancing test, see supra notes 372-376 and
accompanying text. The Senate's argument that the new law was content neutral because it
sought to protect the "physical integrity of the flag by proscribing certain destructive conduct
regardless of the actor's intent to convey a message or the communicative impact on the
audience" was rejected as constituting an attempt to suppress expression, such as "those
viewpoints which are expressed through the symbolic destruction of the flag." Haggerty, 731
F. Supp. at 420 n.6. The Haggerty court similarly rejected the House of Representatives'
argument that the government had a non-speech related interest in shielding "the flag as an
incident of sovereignty with a specific legal significance apart from its symbolic value." Id. at
420. The court noted two flaws in House's argument. First, the court determined that despite
the legislative history's references to the importance of protecting the flag because of the value
it symbolizes, the "legislative history contains not one mention of sovereignty interest as a
reason for enacting legislation." Id. at 421. Second, the court stated that "the use of the flag
as a means of indicating sovereignty is itself a symbolic use." Id. Therefore, any government
interest in protecting such a "sovereignty interest" could only be directed at suppressing
expression which amounted to a "rejection of United States sovereignty, i.e., expressive
conduct." Id. Furthermore, the Haggerty court noted that the House never explained "how
the governmental interest in preserving the flag as an incident of sovereignty would be harmed
by defendants' act of flagburning." Id. at 421 n.7.
631. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. at 420 n.6.
632. Id. at 421.
633. Eichman, 731 F. Supp. at 1130-31. The Justice Department's position, which taken to
its logical conclusion would destroy the entire concept of the Court's role in protecting
minorities against majority assaults on their basic rights, was summarily rejected by both
district courts. These courts noted that the Johnson Court had proclaimed that protection of
minority political dissent was a "bedrock principle" which was "situated at the core of our
First Amendment values." Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. at 421 (quoting Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at
2543); see Eichman, 731 F. Supp. at 1131.
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the First Amendment. ' 634 The Haggerty court noted that "in order
for the flag to endure as a symbol of freedom, we must protect with
equal vigor the right to wave it and the right to destroy it."'635
VI. FLAG BURNING: ROUND TWO IN THE SUPREME COURT
AND CONGRESS
A. United States v. Eichman
On March 13, 1990, Solicitor General Kenneth Starr invoked the
extraordinary provisions of the 1989 Flag Protection Act calling for
mandatory and expedited Supreme Court review of any final federal
district court decision.63 6 On March 30, 1990, the Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction and scheduled oral arguments for May 14,
1990.637
Starting with the premise that "the flag stands for something val-
uable, and should be safeguarded because of that value, ' 638 the Gov-
ernment asked the Court to reconsider its holding in Johnson that flag
burning was "expressive conduct meriting full first amendment pro-
tection. 6 39 The Government compared flag burning to previously
excluded forms of expression such as obsenity, child pornography,
defamation, and "fighting words."'  The Government asserted that
"physical destruction" of the flag should be outside the protections of
the first amendment because it is "uniquely ... [an] anathema to the
634. Eichman, 731 F. Supp. at 1131.
635. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. at 422. Perhaps in reference to the recent democratic
revolutions in Eastern Europe, the Haggerty Court declared, "This is an inspiring time for
those of us who treasure freedom," and the "freedom of speech... is the crucial foundation
without which other democratic values cannot flourish." Id. The Court added:
Burning the flag as an expression of political dissent, while repellant to many
Americans, does not jeopardize the freedoms which we hold dear. What would
threaten our liberty is allowing the government to encroach on our right to
political protest. It is with the firm belief that this decision strengthens what our
flag stands for that this court finds the Flag Protection Act unconstitutional as
applied to defendants' conduct in burning the flag.
Id.
636. Staff asked the Supreme Court to consolidate the two district court cases and note
probable jurisdiction within two weeks, to schedule oral arguments for April 25, 1990
(although under ordinary procedures, cases accepted after mid-February would not have been
scheduled until the Fall of 1990), and to order a simultaneous exchange of briefs by April 16,
1990 (although normally 45 days are allowed after the court accepts jurisdiction for the filing
of the first brief with additional time allowed for reply briefs).
637. Joint Appendix at 85, United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (Nos. 89-1433
& 89-1434).
638. Brief for the United States at 42, United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990)
(Nos. 89-1433 & 89-1434) [hereinafter Brief for United States].
639. 1d. at 24.
640. Id. at 31.
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Nation's values" and constitutes a "physical, violent assault on the
most deeply shared experiences of the American people." 4 '
Next, echoing the government's position in the district courts,
the Government argued that in passing the Flag Protection Act of
1989, it had demonstrated a compelling interest to overcome first
amendment protections of speech and expression in connection with
flag desecration." 2 Arguing, in effect, that Congressional passage of a
law was a per se establishment of a compelling governmental interest,
the Government stated:
[T]hrough passage of the Flag Protection Act, the people's elected
representatives have now made clear that the physical integrity of
the flag of the United States, as the unique symbol of the Nation,
merits protection not accorded other national emblems. And that
representative consensus identifies the substantial potential harm
posed by physical damage and mistreatment of the American
flag-the assault upon and injury to the shared values that bind
our national community. Upon reflection, therefore, the assump-
tion so newly and narrowly embraced in Johnson should not now
obliterate Congress's considered-and limited-legislative deter-
mination of the compelling need to protect the physical integrity of
the American flag." 3
In oral argument before the Court on May 14, 1990, the Govern-
ment changed the tenor of its argument. Departing from its brief,
which had essentially conceded that the Flag Protection Act was not
content neutral, 6' the government maintained that in the Flag Pro-
tection Act Congress had followed carefully the Johnson guidelines to
create a law which was free of "content-laden language" 5 and which
protected the physical integrity of the flag without "singling out cer-
tain viewpoints for disfavored treatment.""'6 Congress had created a
law, the Government claimed, that protected the flag "because of its
symbolic value[,] ... not from criticism, but from physical destruction
or mutilation," in the same way that Congress could protect houses of
worship or the bald eagle against destruction, regardless of the moti-
vation."47 The Government also introduced an entirely new position
in oral argument. It asserted that flag burning fails to meet the Spence
641. Id. at 23-24.
642. Id. at 44.
643. Id.
644. Id. at 28-29.
645. Official Transcript of Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States at 5,
United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (Nos. 89-1433 & 89-1434) [hereinafter
Official Transcript].
646. Id. at 16.
647. Id. at 11-13.
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v. Washington"S test of expression requiring delivery of a particular-
ized message,' 49 because flag burning leaves a "major message gap"
and resembles an "overload loudspeaker"65 or the "mindless nihil-
ism" '651 that the Spence Court suggested was undeserving of first
amendment protection.652
In response, defendants argued that based on Johnson the Flag
Protection Act was unconstitutional under the first amendment
because it was not content neutral and not based on any compelling
state interest which justified overriding first amendment rights.
653
They argued that Congress had impermissibly criminalized flag burn-
ing to preserve the flag's symbolic value, directly in contravention of
Johnson's principles. 6 4 Further, the defendants claimed that the pur-
pose of the Flag Protection Act was not solely to protect the flag's
physical integrity. The Act allowed "patriotic" conduct that imper-
illed the flag, such as flying it in a storm or in battle, while it protected
the flag only from "those who would hurt it or cast it in a bad
light" 655 even without physical damage, such as maintaining a flag on
the floor under a glass cover.65 6 The very act of singling out the flag
for special protection, the defendants argued, rendered the law con-
tent based and thus subject to strict scrutiny under the first amend-
ment.657 The defendants maintained that the content-based nature of
the statute would have been immediately apparent if the statute had
forbidden desecrating the "emblem of the Democratic party" instead
of the flag.658
Defendants rejected the Government's analogy between protect-
ing the flag and protecting bald eagles or monuments, arguing that
because flags are infinitely reproducible, non-corporeal symbols, the
appropriate analogy would be between protecting flags and protecting
models of bald eagles or monuments.659 Responding to the House of
Representatives amicus that Congress had a non-speech interest in
648. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
649. Id. at 408.
650. Official Transcript, supra note 645, at 5.
651. Id. at 19.
652. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 408.
653. See Brief for Appellees at 21, United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (Nos.
89-1433 & 89-1434) [hereinafter Defendants' Brief].
654. Id. at 9.
655. Official Transcript, supra note 645, at 28.
656. Defendants' Brief, supra note 653, at 21.
657. Id. at 31. Defendants noted that the Government's urging of Court deference to
Congress in this case would "leave the Bill of Rights to the whims of legislators" and would
place the sanctity of its official symbols above the reality of human freedom." Id..
658. Id.
659. Defendant's Brief, supra note 653, at 14, 22 n.23.
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protecting the flag as an "incident of sovereignty," the defendants
queried how burning a flag would deprive it of its "function in demar-
cating boundaries and identifying ships. '' 6 ° In response to the Gov-
ernment's argument that flag burning did not elicit a particularized
message, defendants stated that "that's true of all non-verbal commu-
nication .... [Y]ou can't relegate non-verbal expression to the scrap
heap."66' When the Government analogized flag desecration to child
pornography or defamation which falls outside the first amendment,
the defendants declared that "in the area of political speech, a govern-
ment cannot make judgments of what is overly offensive or unimpor-
tant." '662 In effect, the defendants argued that the Government was
seeking to turn the flag into a golden image that its citizens must wor-
ship.663 They concluded that "once people are compelled to respect a
political symbol, then they are no longer free and their respect for the
flag is quite meaningless .... To criminalize flag burning is to deny
-what the First Amendment stands for."
6"
The Supreme Court's 5-to-4 decision invalidating the Flag Pro-
tection Act was handed down with extraordinary speed on June 11,
1990, less than a month after oral argument. 665 The Eichman deci-
sion essentially followed Johnson's reasoning in finding that the Boos
v. Barry666 test of "most exacting scrutiny" must apply because the
government's interests of protecting the flag's "status as a symbol of
our Nation and certain national ideals" was related "to the suppres-
sion of free expression." 667 The Court held that protecting the flag's
status of a symbol could not justify "infringement on First Amend-
ment rights" 668 and refused to "reconsider [its] rejection in Johnson of
the claim that flag burning as a'mode of expression, like obscenity or
'fighting words' does not enjoy the full protection of the First Amend-
660. Id. at 27.
661. Official Transcript, supra note 645, at 35.
662. Id. at 45.
663. Id. at 47.
664. Id. at 46.
665. See Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2404. In response to the Government's argument that flag
burning did not convey a particularized message, Justice Kennedy termed flag burning an
"internationally recognized form of protest," while Justice Scalia said the message clearly was,
"I am in opposition to this country." See Official Transcript, supra note 645, at 8, 15. Justice
Scalia also issued a devastating critique of the government's claim that the Flag Protection Act
was "content neutral" given the wording of the law. He declared that "if I get a spot on my
tie, I don't say, gee, I've defiled my tie.... Or if I tear my jacket I don't say, my, I've mutilated
my jacket. These are words of cast contempt upon." Id. at 17.
666. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). For a discussion of Boos v. Barry, see supra notes 41-45 & 411-14
and accompanying text.
667. See Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2408-09.
668. Id. at 2409.
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ment."669 Conceding that the federal law, unlike the Texas statute at
issue in Johnson, "contain[ed] no explicit content-based limitation on
the scope of prohibited conduct,"670 the Court nevertheless applied its
strict scrutiny test because the Act suffered from the same fundamen-
tal flaw as the Texas law. It could not be "justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech."67 This conclusion was clear
not only from the government's asserted interest in protecting the
flag's symbolic value, but also from the "precise language" of the law,
which outlawed conduct "connot[ing] disrespectful treatment of the
flag" while simultaneously exempting disposition of worn flags by
methods "traditionally associated with patriotic respect for the
flag."167 2 The Court accepted the argument of the government's ami-
cus that the flag is "emblematic of the Nation as a sovereign
entity," '673 and that the government had a legitimate interest in pre-
serving this function, but noted that the amicus could not explain how
the law was "designed to advance this asserted interest" since flag
burning "does not threaten to interfere with [it]." '674
The Court rejected the government's argument that protecting
the symbolic value of the flag could not infringe upon first amend-
ment rights in view of "Congress' recent recognition of a purported
'national consensus' favoring a prohibition of flag burning." '675 The
Court bluntly declared that "any suggestion that the Government's
interest in suppressing speech becomes more weighty as popular
opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the first amendment.
676
Recognizing that flag desecration is "deeply offensive to many," the
Court pointed out that the same could be said about other forms of
protected speech, such as "virulent ethnic and religious epithets...
vulgar repudiations of the draft ... and scurrilous caricatures. ' 677 It
concluded by quoting its own "bedrock principle" statement from
Johnson and declared that "[p]unishing desecration of the flag dilutes
the very freedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worthy of
revering.
67 8
669. Id. at 2407.
670. Id. at 2408.
671. Id.
672. Id. at 2409.
673. Id. at 2408 n.6 (citing Brief for the Speaker and the Leadership Group of the United
States House of Representatives at 25, United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (Nos.
89-1433 & 89-1434)).
674. Id.
675. Id. at 2409 (citing Brief for United States, supra note 642, at 27).
676. Id. at 2409.
677. Id. at 2410 (citations omitted).
678. Id.
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Similar to the Johnson dissent, the dissent in Eichman claimed
that the unique importance of the flag, such as its role in symbolizing
"the ideas of liberty, equality and tolerance,"67 9 justified infringing
upon political expression to protect its symbolic value, especially
when there was no "interference with the speaker's freedom to
express his or her ideas by other means. ' 6 0 However, the tone of the
dissent was far less passionate than in Johnson. For example, whereas
in Johnson, Justice Stevens had clearly compared flag desecration to
placing "graffiti on the Washington Monument" 61' and Chief Justice
Rehnquist lumped flag burning together with murder and embezzle-
ment,682 in Eichman, Justice Stevens clearly repudiated such analo-
gies by declaring that burning a privately-owned flag "is not, of
course, equivalent to burning a public building" as it "causes no phys-
ical harm to other persons or to their property" and its impact is
"purely symbolic. ' 683 Further, the Eichman dissent delivered a sharp
rebuke to some politicians who opposed flag burning by stating that
"[t]he integrity of the symbol has been compromised by those leaders
who seem to advocate compulsory worship of the flag even by individ-
uals whom it offends, or who seem to manipulate the symbol of
national purpose into a pretext for partisan disputes about meaner
ends.
6 84
B. The Attempted Constitutional Amendment in 1990
After Eichman, President Bush and members of Congress again
called for the passage of a constitutional amendment prohibiting flag
desecration. Bush declared, "The law books are full of restrictions on
free speech. And we ought to have this be one of them." 6 5 In the
immediate aftermath of Eichman, many predicted that a constitu-
tional amendment would pass quickly and without difficulty. Thus,
on the day of the Eichman decision, Republican House minority
leader Robert Michel, an amendment advocate, predicted Congres-
sional passage, asking rhetorically, "Who wants to be against the flag,
mother and apple pie?" 686 And Harvard Law Professor Christopher
Edley, the issues director for the 1988 Dukakis campaign, declared,
679. Id. at 2411. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
680. Id.
681. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2556 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
682. Id. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
683. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2412 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
684. Id.
685. Balz & Kenworthy, Bush Again Calls for Flag Amendment, Wash. Post, June 13, 1990,
at AI, col. 1.
686. Koenig, Ruling Heats Up Dispute in Congress over Flag Amendment, St. Louis
Dispatch, June 12, 1990, at A13, col. 1.
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"Opposition to the amendment may be noble, but it may take a mira-
cle to stop it."
6 87
Public opinion polls indicated that about sixty percent of the
public favored passage of a constitutional amendment.6"' The inten-
sity of public interest, however, was far weaker in mid-1990 than it
had been a year earlier. This loss of interest undoubtedly played a key
role in the amendment's demise. For example, Democratic Represen-
tative Richard Durbin of Ohio, who listed himself as undecided as of
June 18, stated, "The phone isn't ringing, the mail isn't coming in.
The intensity of this is much lower than a year ago."6 9 Similarly,
Democratic Representative Dennis Eckart of Ohio, an announced
amendment supporter, declared, "There is nowhere near the [mail]
volume as there was ... a year ago."' 69 0 And an anonymous high-level
Republican operative was quoted as lamenting, "This is an issue
whose time has come and gone.""69 This perceived lack of intense
public demand for a flag amendment no doubt helped to persuade
undecided congressmen to oppose the amendment in the weeks fol-
lowing Eichman. An Associated Press survey published June 20,
1990, indicated that 255 Representatives and 58. Senators favored an
amendment, while 114 Representatives and 24 Senators opposed one,
leaving 65 Representatives and 18 Senators undecided.692 In the June
21 House vote, however, there were 177 negative votes, and in the
June 26 Senate vote, there were 42 negative votes,693 indicating that
virtually all wavering congressmen ended up opposing the
amendment.
There are several reasons why an issue that one Washington
reporter termed "hot as a magnesium flare" in the summer of 1989
had become politically lukewarm by the late spring and early summer
of 1990.694 Although proponents of the Flag Protection Act failed in
the sense that the Supreme Court invalidated the law, some of the
statute's less enthusiastic backers succeeded in delaying serious con-
sideration of a constitutional amendment until passions cooled. The
687. Shribman & Wermeil, Justices Strike Down Flag Burning Law Revising a Push to
Amend Constitution, Wall St. J., June 12, 1990, at A18, col. 1.
688. Sacred Symbol, Nat'l J., June 30, 1990, at 1624, col. 1; Flag Amendment a Burning
Issue, USA Today, June 13, 1990, at 1, col. 2.
689. Kenworthy & Taylor, Opponents of Flag Amendment Seeking Quick Kill on House
Floor, Wash. Post, June 19, 1990, at A8, col. 1.
690. Id.
691. Id.
692. Plain Dealer (Cleveland, OH), June 20, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
693. See Biskupic, supra note 87 and accompanying text.
694. Hey, Flag Desecration a Burning Issue Again in Washington, Christian Sci. Monitor,
June 13, 1990, at 9, col. 3.
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public simply lost much of its interest in an issue that had not only
dragged on for a year, but which had become, in effect, a summer re-
run. This was especially true given that most Americans never saw
anyone burn a flag except on television and were not really affected in
their daily lives by flag burners. As an anonymous House Democratic
leadership aide told the National Journal, "Put this up against
whether or not people think they have got enough money to send
their kids to college, and this isn't going to be an issue. '6
95
Another factor that strengthened opposition to a constitutional
amendment was the negative public reaction to the political mileage
that amendment backers overtly indicated they intended to get for
their vote.696 On the day of the Eichman decision, for example, Sen-
ate Minority Leader Robert Dole declared that a vote against a con-
stitutional amendment "would make a pretty good 30-second spot"
during the 1990 elections.697 Marc Nuttle, executive director of the
National Republican Congressional Committee, termed the fight over
the amendment a "real opportunity" that "allows us to make a true
comparison between parties and candidates. '691 Such statements
aroused sharp criticism on both sides of the political aisle and irri-
tated members of the public already cynical about politicians'
motives. Thus, as one Republican political consultant advised,
"Democrats who get on the wrong side of this may face political
oblivion, but Republicans who exploit it ought to face intellectual
hell."
699
A final factor that may have influenced the public's ambivalence
about a constitutional amendment in 1990 was that the "framing" of
the argument varied greatly from that of the previous year. In 1989,
Republican Senator Strom Thurmond told his Senate Judiciary col-
leagues at the beginning of hearings on August 1 that the goal was to
determine "the most desirable and effective approach to" overturn
Johnson. °  Similarly, House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights Chairman Don Edwards, a well known civil lib-
ertarian, told his colleagues at the beginning of his hearings on July 13
that their task was to determine "just how we can ensure consistent
with our constitutional freedoms that this symbol of our liberty can be
695. Back at the Great Divide, Nat'l J., June 23, 1990, at 1569, col. 1.
696. The number of political references by Republican amendment backers sharply
contrasted with the paucity of overt political comments in the aftermath of Johnson.
697. Kennedy & Dewar, Ruling Rekindles Amendment Debate, Wash. Post, June 12, 1990,
at A7, col. 1.
698. See Shribman & Wermeil, supra note 687, at AlS, col. 1.
699. Id.
700. See Senate Hearings, supra note 495.
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protected from harm."7 1 With the issue thus framed, the concept
that the flag could not or should not be protected from harm never
entered the 1989 political arena. The only question was whether Con-
gress would vote for passage of an amendment or passage of a law,
both of which in fact would infringe upon freedom of expression.
Following Eichman, which effectively eliminated the statutory
option, opponents of an amendment, including many who had shown
no compunction about diminishing freedom of expression through
legislation the previous year, got constitutional religion. They
reframed the issue as a battle of competing icons: the flag, which
symbolizes liberty, versus the Constitution and Bill of Rights, both of
which provide the substance of liberty. Thus, on the day the Eichman
decision was rendered, Senate Democratic Majority Leader George
Mitchell declared that "[tihe issue is not the flag [but] whether we are
going to amend the Bill of Rights,"70 2 while Senator Edward Ken-
nedy declared that "[w]e don't need to destroy the First Amendment
in order to save the American flag. 
°703
This reframing of the question to stress the freedom of expression
issues at heart in the flag controversy was likely enhanced in its appeal
by the East European democratic revolutions of late 1989, which had
prominantly featured widespread desecration of national flags to sup-
port demands for greater freedoms.7M In reference to these European
changes, Representative Louise Slaughter expressed opposition to the
constitutional amendment and told the House on June 21, 1990:
A year ago last April I had an opportunity to visit Hungary when
they were writing their constitution. They were eager to talk to us
about the Bill of Rights. . . .When we saw people in Eastern
Europe carrying the flags of their country with the hammer and
sickle cut out of the middle, all of us had to realize that had they
done that before changes in those regimes, they would have been
immediately punished and put in jail because they did not have the
liberty to protest as we do .... If our future generations of Ameri-
cans must serve [in battle] do not send them out to carry a flag
diminished by our action here today.705
Similarly, Representative Jim Slattery told the House on the same
day, "We have a choice. We can join countries like the Soviet Union,
701. See House Hearings, supra note 495.
702. See Koenig, supra note 686, at A13, col. 1.
703. Rejection of Flag Burning Law Sets Stage for Constitutional Fight, Plain Dealer
(Cleveland, OH), June 12, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
704. Savage, High Court Voids Law Against Flag Burning, L.A. Times, June 12, 1990, at
AI, col. 2.
705. 136 CONG. REC. H4047-48 (daily ed. June 21, 1990).
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Iran, South Africa and China, who have banned flag burning, or we
can express our unwavering support for the fundamental freedoms
contained in our Bill of Rights represented by the flag we all love." 7
VII. CONCLUSION
In assessing the 1989-1990 flag burning controversy, Congress-
man Don Edwards lamented, "To think that a nincompoop in Dallas,
Texas, could do something that could trigger this reaction is rather
distressing."70 The reaction displayed by both the American public
and the political elite certainly says some distressing things about the
health of the American body politic. Although this reaction demon-
strates that forms of symbolic political protest like flag burning are
unlikely to generate any significant public support, in a peculiar way
the American political system is indebted to Joey Johnson for expos-
ing some of its fundamental and distressing realities. In particular,
The Great 1989-1990 Flag Flap suggests a distinct lack of political
courage and understanding of basic democratic principles among
many and, perhaps, most of America's elites and general population.
It also illustrates an eagerness among elites to devote vast amounts of
time and energy in squelching unthreatening symbolic protests rather
than addressing more far-reaching problems that persistently erode
our society. The striking down of the Flag Protection Act of 1989
and the failure of a constitutional amendment provides little comfort
since not only did attempts to suppress the expression of a fundamen-
tal right consume Washington for over one year and divert attention
away from more pressing issues, but these attempts repeatedly gained
the support of majorities of both Houses of Congress, of President
Bush, and, perhaps most frightening of all, of four out of nine
Supreme Court Justices. Although by the late fall of 1990 the entire
flag desecration issue seemed to have died, the recent resignation of
Justice Brennan raises the prospect that a flag desecration law might
pass constitutional muster in the future.
Whatever one's opinion of the wisdom of flag burning as a means
of political protest, there can be no question that it is a form of polit-
ical expression that has no concrete adverse consequences. Not only
has the frequency of such behavior been minimal during the last fif-
teen years, but as Washington Post columnist Judy Mann pointed out,
"[W]hen it happens, the sum total of the damage is a burned flag. No
706. Id. at H4044.
707. Phillips & Dewar, supra note 430, at A17, col. 1.
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one is deprived of liberty or justice."7 °8 Every bit of evidence from
both the Vietnam War and The Great 1989-1990 Flag Flaps suggests
that, rather than diminishing the symbolic value of the flag in the eyes
of most Americans, flag burnings have exactly the opposite effect. In
fact, few Americans recently have done as much to buoy patriotism as
Joey Johnson.
Even if mass flag burnings were to become everyday occurrences,
by themselves such actions would do no real harm. Indeed, they may
even provide the service of informing political leaders of their constit-
uents' most adamant grievances. In any case, sending flag abusers to
jail is hardly going to convert them into flag waving patriots, nor will
it produce any other positive effects.
As burning the flag is a form of harmless political expression,
clearly protected by the Bill of Rights, the real significance of the
1989-1990 controversy is found in the reaction that it caused. This
reaction was considerably amplified by politicians and their aspira-
tions. The political stakes involved were demonstrated by House
Speaker Tom Foley, a supporter of the Flag Protection Act, when he
protested, "Anybody who suggests that there is a party difference in
respect for the American flag is using this deep affection of Ameri-
cans, twisting it, manipulating it, using it for the most base and crass
political purposes."'7°"
However, political pandering over the flag issue would be effec-
tive only if there was a responsive audience, and thus the deeper sig-
nificance of the 1989-1990 flag controversy is not that the issue was
exploited, but that it was so exploitable. The ultimate explanation for
this fact lies not on the surface of public reaction-that Americans are
full of pride and support for their country-but rather, the explana-
tion lurks underneath that surface, where insecurity and doubts about
the fundamental health of the country prevail. Certainly, the massive
political and public reaction to a handful of flag burnings is not a sign
of national self-confidence, but rather one of national self-doubt.
This insecurity apparently stems from a collective feeling of an
America in decline, both internationally and domestically. Interna-
tionally, despite minor psychological victories like the invasions of
Grenada and Panama and the current patriotic upsurge to protect
Kuwait, the American psyche still suffers not only from the trauma of
Vietnam, but also from recurrent strategic failures in places such as
708. Mann, Defending Symbols and Denying Justice, Wash. Post, June 30, 1989, at C3, col.
4.
709. Simpson, Decision Unravels Flag's Very Fabric, Wash. (D.C.) Times, July 24, 1989, at
C5, col. 1 (quoting House Speaker Thomas S. Foley (D. Wash.)).
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Lebanon and Iran, coupled with a severe lessening of America's rela-
tive economic prowess. Historian Terrence McDonald of the Univer-
sity of Michigan notes that, in the twentieth century, "It's always
been a good idea for a politician to wrap himself in the flag. [The]
resurgent nationalism [of 1989 is] linked to the perceived decline in
American power in relation to the rest of the world. When reality
gets too hard to handle, you can fall back on symbols of
nationhood."710
A similarly perceived deterioration of American domestic life has
also contributed to the collective expression of insecurity. Thus,
Richard Madsen, a sociologist at the University of California at San
Diego states that "American concern about the flag is a sign of great
insecurity about our own values and unity. Many people have the
sense of America in decline, a sense of intractable problems from drug
abuse to the environment. Under these conditions, people get doubly
upset when the flag is desecrated. '7
1'
Evidence in support of this analysis abounds. After the Johnson
decision, a visitor to the site of the American revolutionary battlefield
at Concord, Massachusetts, told a reporter, "The country is torn by
crime and drugs. We really should have something to rally
around. '71 2 In the minority report supporting a constitutional
amendment (rather than a law) to overturn Johnson, ten members of
the House Judiciary Committee stated that "[i]n this day and age,
when it seems that perversion is accepted and morality [is] a taboo
religion, perhaps this small mandate for freedom is not asking too
much!"713 Columnists and letters to the editors of America's newspa-
pers often implied a similar theme. Columnist Ray Kerrison, for
example, lumped the Court's decision with what he termed the "step
by step [dismantling of] nearly all the institutions, beliefs, practices
and safeguards of the past 200 years." 714 He further held that there
was nothing suprising about this in a "climate where family life is in
shreds, [marriage is a] take-it or leave-it proposition, [the] school sys-
tem is poisoned with destructive social aberrations, [and] religion is
not only mocked and ridiculed incessantly on radio and TV, but these
attacks are subsidized in the arts by federal and state govern-
ments. ' 71 5 Similarly, a letter writer to the New York Times declared,
in reference to the Johnson decision, that "America is in a free fall"
710. Alters, supra note 131, at 1, col. 2.
711. D'Antonio & Firstman, supra note 58, at 4.
712. Alters, supra note 131, at 1, col. 2.
713. H.R. REP., supra note 542, at 22.
714. N.Y. Post, June 23, 1989, at A6, col. 2.
715. Id.
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like a truck "plummeting downhill in pitch darkness with no brakes,
no headlights to illuminate our vision of where the road is
heading.
716
In addition to reflecting public insecurity about the state of the
country, The Great 1989-1990 Flag Flap also suggests that the Amer-
ican political leadership is too often consumed with symbols rather
than substance. Either out of inability or a reluctance to tackle real
problems, much of the leadership seems to be more comfortable with
unproductive and ultimately divisive public relations extravaganzas
concerning purely symbolic issues. As Senator Bob Kerrey of
Nebraska pointed out with regard to the flag debate:
When you're all done arguing, what have you got? Have you built
a house? Have you helped somebody? Have you created a better
world? Have you fought a battle worth fighting? Or are you bang-
ing into the shadows on the wall of a cave? It seems to me there's
nothing produced from it and you've divided the nation."7"
The Seattle Times similarly pointed out that, above all, the flag con-
troversy amounted to a distraction from the real issues and thus
reflected poorly on the quality of the nation's leaders:
Into a nation plagued by inadequate housing, rampant drug abuse,
a mammoth federal budget deficit and the growing specter of
AIDS, those wonderful folks in Washington, D.C. have introduced
a flag law....
The real desecration of democracy occurs when people don't
have places to live or work or adequate health insurance....
Those kind of issues don't seem to play well in the nation's
capital. Maybe it's because they require real statescraft and that's
in a lot shorter supply than the hype and rhetoric that's been con-
jured up around a non-issue like flag burning.718
716. Doughty, America in a Free Fall, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1989, at E12, col. 3 (letter to the
editor). Illinois Republican Congressman Henry Hyde perhaps best articulated the view that
the burning of a symbol itself represented a symbol of a country in decline, when he told the
House Judiciary Committee on June 19, 1990:
Those who are shocked, revolted and frustrated by the excesses of the counter-
culture, the pornography and obscenity that inundates our entertainment
industry, the drugs, the AIDS explosion, the high abortion rate view flag burning
as one more slap in the face of millions of veterans who found enough values in
America to risk their lives in combat. People resent the vulgarization of their
country. . . . I once saw a bumper-sticker that said, "Honk if you believe in
anything!" That says it all for some people.
Newsletter from Henry J. Hyde to his constituents (June 19, 1990) (discussing flag protection
amendment).
717. Toner, supra note 568, at 1, col. 4 (quoting Senator Robert Kerrey).
718. Editorials on File, supra note 581, at 1198 (quoting a Seattle Times editorial (Oct. 14,
1989)).
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The amount of time and energy devoted by those in power to The
Great 1989-1990 Flag Flap reflects a political system which increas-
ingly emphasizes smoke and mirrors above real political discussions
and real political issues. Although the American people certainly
cannot escape some responsibility, ultimately it is the American lead-
ership that sets the tone and must bear the bulk of the blame for this.
If accusing leaders of diverting public and political attention
away from real issues and pandering to the public's worst instincts is a
strong accusation, then a far more serious charge is that these leaders
apparently have little or no faith or understanding in the most basic of
democratic principles: the free marketplace of ideas and tolerance for
even the most unpopular and offensive political dissent.7' 9 This fun-
damental democratic lesson was eloquently expressed by Justice Jack-
son in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette:720 "If there
is any fixed star in our constitutonal constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nation-
alism, religion or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein."' 72 ' It is a sad commentary that in
1989-1990, the two-hundredth anniversary of the drafting and ratifi-
cation of the Bill of Rights, the American political leadership still
needs to learn this lesson and to reflect it in their daily words and
actions.
719. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
720. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
721. Id. at 642.
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